The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
968.
The MOD
officials wrote that “for some platforms deployability and
sustainment on
operations
would be enhanced through the provision of sufficiently ranged,
scaled and
supported
DSPs; for those platforms currently deployed on operations, CPF
[Conflict
Prevention
Fund] claims mechanisms and Urgent Sustainability Requirements
are
already in
place”.
969.
Gen O’Donoghue
wrote to Gen Granville‑Chapman about those findings
on
14
September to say that the MOD was “currently missing a clear
statement of the
operational
requirement for SH – both readiness and
sustainment”.511
970.
Gen O’Donoghue
wrote that a paper was being produced for a meeting on
7 October.
It was “an extensive piece of work” which was expected to clarify
the
requirements.
Gen O’ Donoghue wrote that he would “therefore concentrate
this minute
on the art
of the possible and focus on what can be ‘sweated’ from our current
fleet”.
971.
There were
three groups of factors which had to be addressed to
deliver
improved availability:
•
“depth
maintenance and support”, including the need to accelerate Repair
and
Overhaul
(R&O) output and better utilisation of the sustainment
fleet;
•
“forward
logistic factors” such as DSPs and maintenance manpower;
and
•
aircrew
availability and requirement, which was “an issue for the FLCs
[Front
Line
Commands]”.
972.
On 12
September, the Private Office of Dr John Reid, the Defence
Secretary,
sought
confirmation from Gen Walker whether, “in the event of a
slower than expected
drawdown of
UK forces in Iraq”, the planning assumptions for deployment to
Afghanistan
973.
Gen Walker’s
Office replied on 19 September.513
The “short
answer” was “yes” but
with the
warning that “such a situation would lead to some pain and grief”.
In particular:
“The hoped
for easement of pressure on our current ‘pinch points’,
especially
helicopter
support … would be delayed.”
974.
On 19
September, two UK soldiers were involved in what became known
as
“the Jameat
incident”; an incident where they were arrested and mistreated by
Iraqi
Police
Service (IPS) personnel and only released after a second rescue
operation was
successful.
That incident is covered in detail in Sections 9.4 and 12.1, along
with its
implications
for security in Basra.
975.
A paper
considering those implications, produced jointly by the FCO, the
MOD
and DFID on
30 September, stated that UK police training teams would need
“improved
511
Minute CDL
to VCDS, 14 September 2005, ‘Improving the Availability of Support
Helicopters’.
512
Minute
APS/Secretary of State [MOD] to PSO/CDS, 12 September 2005,
‘Iraq/Afghanistan
Commitments’.
513
Minute PSO
to APS2/SoS [MOD], 19 September 2005, ‘Iraq/Afghanistan
Commitments’.
164