12.1 | Security Sector Reform

611. On 21 September, Maj Gen Houghton produced a paper for the Chiefs of Staff

on “the prospects for developing capable and effective Iraqi Security Forces”.549 He

described the development of the ISF as “not pretty”. The reasons given for that included

de‑Ba’athification, the decision to disband the Iraqi armed forces and the absence of a

strategy for Iraq’s security sector architecture. The last had now largely been addressed

by the National Security Strategy, although it was not “officially signed off”.

612. Maj Gen Houghton wrote that there had been “an understandable tendency by

some to ‘talk‑up’ the timescales” for delivering manpower, equipment and training.

Progress had been made but “must be set in the context of significant political frustration

at the highest levels of Iraq, US and UK government”. He offered that one conclusion

was that:

“… the current political frustration at the lack of progress in ISF development may

be mis‑directed. It is focusing too much on short‑term, physical and – to an extent –

symbolic representations of capability; it is not focusing enough on the capabilities

which will actually allow Iraq to fight its own campaign. The need to meet this latter

requirement may be brought closer in time as a result of the elections in the new year.”

613. On 22 September, Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair with advice on how the ISF would

develop.550 He stated:

“It is clear that Allawi feels frustrated with progress on Iraqiisation … Our current

assessment is that the Petraeus Plan will deliver ISF scaled to meet Iraq’s needs,

including a limited offensive capability in time for the elections in January 2005.

Allawi’s concerns are undoubtedly genuine.”

614. No.10 “pressed MOD for a full and imaginative response to Allawi’s request”.551

Mr Hoon was “asked for more detail and a better focus” by No.10 after writing to Mr Blair

on 27 September.552

615. Mr Naworynsky addressed that request in a letter to Mr Quarrey on 30 September

after receiving advice from Lt Gen Fry.553 While the MOD accepted that the pace of

progress “could have been more rapid”, its judgement was:

“… that the Petraeus plan will deliver the required capability and does not need a

radical overhaul. Indeed, to do so would stall momentum and delay the progress

which Allawi desires. Indeed, we run the risk of a ‘new plan’ causing confusion with

the existing plan.”

549 Minute ACDS(Ops) to COSSEC, 21 September 2004, ‘Developing Capable and Effective Iraqi

Security Forces’.

550 Letter Hoon to Blair, 22 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Petreus Plan [sic]’.

551 Minute Quarrey to Blair, 1 October 2004, ‘Iraqi‑isation’.

552 The Inquiry has not seen the 27 September letter from Mr Hoon to Mr Blair.

553 Letter Naworynsky to Quarrey, 30 September 2004, [untitled].

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