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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Mexico could be shifted, that would “change the weather”. If France and Russia then
vetoed the resolution but the “numbers were right on the UN”, Mr Blair thought that
he would “have a fighting chance of getting it through the Commons”. Subsequently,
Mr Blair had suggested that a change in Chile and Mexico’s position might be used
to influence Mr Vladimir Putin, the Russian President.
101.  President Bush was “worried about rolling in more time” but Mr Blair had “held his
ground”, arguing that Chile and Mexico would “need to be able to point to something that
they won last minute that explains why they finally supported us”. President Bush “said
‘Let me be frank. The second resolution is for the benefit of Great Britain. We would
want it so we can go ahead together.’” President Bush’s position was that the US and
the UK “must not retreat from 1441 and we cannot keep giving them more time”; it was
“time to do this” and there should be “no more deals”.
102.  Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair concluded the conversation by saying “he was
sure we were doing the right thing and we had to see it through, but it was going to be
tough”. President Bush had replied: “Hang on in there friend.”
103.  Mr Campbell wrote that he “felt a bit sick” about “the extent to which our problems
were US-created, and our politics now so dominated by their approach”.
104.  Sir David Manning sent the UK’s proposals for a revised deadline and a side
statement identifying six tests on which Saddam Hussein’s intentions would be
judged to Dr Rice and to President Lagos.
105.  Reflecting some of the comments from Dr Blix and Mr Dowse, Sir David Manning
wrote to Dr Rice setting out six proposed tests, with additional details in a “draft side
statement”, which Mr Blair had “briefly described” to President Bush:
a public statement in Arabic by Saddam Hussein announcing that:
{{Iraq had in the past sought to conceal its WMD and other proscribed
activities but had taken a strategic decision not to produce or retain them;
{{Iraq would immediately yield all prohibited and proscribed material to the
weapons inspectors;
{{Iraq would co-operate fully with UNMOVIC and the IAEA in immediately
addressing and resolving all outstanding questions; and
{{all government personnel and citizens would cease any proscribed activity
and provide items, documentation and information to the inspectors;
undertakings to:
{{make at least 30 Iraqi scientists available for interview outside Iraq;
{{surrender all remaining anthrax and anthrax production capability
(including growth media) and provide credible evidence to account for
outstanding questions on production and destruction;
{{surrender all mobile bio-production laboratories for destruction;
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