14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
1011.
The DOC
recommended:
“… we
should reconsider addressing the ISTAR capability requirements,
particularly
in
addressing surveillance generally and UAVs
specifically.”
1012.
On battlefield
helicopters, the report stated that their capacity to
support
operations
had “become parlous at times during 2005”.
“The
requirement for an air bridge between Baghdad International Airport
and the
International
Zone because of the increases – and sustained – threat on
Route
Irish, and
the requirement to provide enhanced IED ‘top‑cover’ have
together
compounded
the situation. The matter is compounded further by shortcomings in
the
contracted
servicing of mission critical equipment … JHF(I) has struggled to
meet its
tasks even
with rigorous prioritisation. There are several factors that
exacerbate the
problem but
it is apparent that the UK’s BH [battlefield helicopter] force is
stretched
to meet the
requirement of the current operation.”
1014.
The DOC quoted
Maj Gen Dutton’s assertion from his Hauldown
Report
that more helicopters
were urgently needed in theatre and added that, with
the
“significant
deployment to Afghanistan”, that situation was “predicted to
worsen
throughout
2006”. That highlighted “the serious overall shortcomings in the
UK’s
battlefield
helicopter capacity”.
1015.
The DOC report
stated: “There is an urgent requirement to assess and
improve
our BH
capacity as an operational priority in the short and medium
term.”
The
Directorate of Operational Capability (DOC) report on 4 April 2006
stated that
FPE should
be viewed in relation to investment in protected mobility and
counter IED.
It highlighted
data from PJHQ that indicated that 24 percent of all attacks had
been
against
camps and other static locations, resulting in 44 percent of all
wounded in action.
The DOC
explained that, to that date, FPE expertise had resided largely in
Northern
Ireland.
Technical designs and construction standards had then been provided
to other
theatres
(including Iraq) for implementation. Additional FPE Research and
Development
(R&D)
was funded by the Equipment Capability Customer but the two strands
were “not
co‑ordinated”.
There was
“an enduring need to provide security forces (and other
government
departments
when required) with secure and protected operating bases from which
they
can
effectively control the ground and interface with the indigenous
population”. The need
for an
“appropriately resourced FPE capability (for the Land environment)”
had been
endorsed by
the Executive Committee of the Army Board.
The DOC
recommended: “Short term action is required to fill the funding gap
for FPE
development
and in the longer term, policy must be developed to ensure that FPE
is
brought
into core business post Northern Ireland
‘Normalisation.’”
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