The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
815.
Mr Llewellyn
had forwarded Ms Adams’ letter of 9 February to
Mr Crompton,
Head of
the Iraq Policy Unit, on 25 February, observing that he “may want
to draw it
to the
attention of Ministers”.451
He had also
commented:
“These
conclusions are not a surprise. They confirm the advice that we
have given
throughout
the period of Occupation.”
816.
The IPU had
brought the concerns set out in Mr Llewellyn’s letter of 25
February to
the
attention of Mr Richmond in Baghdad.
817.
On 15 March
Mr Richmond replied, explaining that he had spoken to one of
the
US lawyers
in the CPA Office of the General Counsel (OGC – the CPA’s legal
advisers)
to ask if
they could reinstate the previous practice of consulting the UN on
CPA orders
by faxing
them to Mr Mountain.452
OGC were
content to do so, but Ambassador Bremer
was not.
818.
It had been
reported to Mr Richmond that, when the UN left Iraq in August
2003,
OGC began
sending draft legislation to the UN legal office through the US
Mission to
the UN
(USUN). USUN were subsequently advised by a “reliable source” that,
if they
continued
to do this, the UN Legal Office was likely to veto legislation.
Consultation had
then
ceased. When Mr Mountain was appointed, OGC had suggested that
they should
send draft
CPA orders to him but the State Department had objected on the
grounds that
he would
forward it to the UN legal office, who would veto it.
819.
State
Department officials suggested that OGC should simply mention
to
Mr Mountain
when he was in Baghdad that they had legislation in various areas
in
process.
OGC agreed with the UK that this was not sufficient consideration
to meet
the requirements
of resolution 1483.
820.
Mr Richmond
explained that OGC had tried to agree a new process of
consultation
with the UN
but Ambassador Bremer had objected to the proposals. He wished
to
avoid both
a UN veto over proposed CPA Orders and delay to the CPA’s
legislative
programme.
As a result, the State Department had been asked to come up with
a
suitable
proposal for consulting the UN which would not result in CPA orders
being
vetoed or
delayed.
821.
The Cabinet
Office Annotated Agenda for the meeting of the AHMGIR on
18 March
said
that:
“Sistani
remains concerned at what he sees as obstacles in the TAL to
achieving a
constitutionally
elected government, in particular the effective veto over the
future
draft
constitution given to the Kurds. There have been indications that
Sistani is
451
Letter
Llewelyn to Crompton, 25 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Attorney General’s
Advice: The Extent of the
UK’s
International Obligations in Iraq’.
452
Letter
Richmond to Crompton, 156 [sic] March 2004, ‘Iraq CPA Legislation:
need for UN co-ordination’.
340