The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
668.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell reached agreement on the text of the
draft
resolution
on 20 February.
669.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock gave Ambassador Negroponte a revised “light
draft
resolution”
on 19 February which:
•
noted
(draft preambular paragraph 5) that Iraq had “submitted a
declaration …
containing
false statements and omissions and has failed to comply with
and
co‑operate
fully in the implementation of that resolution [1441]”;
and
•
decided
(draft OP1) that Iraq had “failed to take the final opportunity
afforded
to it
in resolution 1441 (2002)”.185
670.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he had told Ambassador Negroponte that the draft
“was
thin on
anything with which Council members could argue and would be less
frightening
to the
middle ground”. It did not refer to “serious consequences” and that
“instead of
relying on
OP4 of 1441”, the draft resolution “relied on OP1 of 1441,
re-establishing the
material
breach suspended in OP2”.186
671.
Sir Jeremy
added that issuing the draft would signal the intent to move to a
final
debate,
which they should seek to focus “not on individual elements of
co-operation but
on the
failure by Iraq to voluntarily disarm” and being “thrown off course
by individual
benchmarks
or judgement by Blix”. It should be accompanied by a “powerful
statement
about what
1441 had asked for” which had “been twisted into partial,
procedural,
and
grudging co-operation from Iraq”; and that “substantive, active and
voluntary
co‑operation
was not happening”.
672.
In response to
a question from the US about whether the “central
premise”,
that the
final opportunity was “now over”, would be disputed, Sir Jeremy
said that:
“was where
we would have to define our terms carefully: voluntary
disarmament
was not
happening.”
673.
The US and UK
agreed they should co-sponsor the resolution with Spain and
that
the UK
would “lead in explaining it to the Council”.
674.
Lord
Goldsmith’s response to Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s rationale for the
second
resolution
is addressed in Section 5.
675.
Mr Straw
had two conversations with Secretary Powell on 20 February. In
the
first, they
discussed UK and US drafts for a second resolution. Mr Straw
said that he
had “no
firm view about which one was best”.187
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s view was
that the
lighter the language the more likely the UK was to attract the
support needed
185
Telegram
288 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 19
February:
Draft Resolution’.
186
Telegram
287 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 19
February’.
187
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Colin Powell, 20 February’.
298