12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

1423.  The paper identified three “sub‑programmes”:

• Supporting the MOI and IPS with training and development programmes.

£12.98m was available from the Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF) and £8m from the

Peacekeeping budget.

• Supporting the Iraqi judiciary and wider justice system – the paper did not

explain how that would be done other than stating it would “support” its various

components and build Basra’s professional links in the Middle East. £3.18m was

available from the SAF.

• Supporting the IMOD by building a professional cadre of IMOD civil servants

through mentoring. Resources to be delivered from the MOD’s administrative

budget.

Withdrawal and Provincial Iraqi Control for Basra

1424.  On 8 October 2007, Mr Brown announced plans for a significant troop drawdown

over the next 12 months (dealt with in Section 9.6).1304 He described the need for two

remaining phases:

“In the first, the British forces that remain in Iraq will have the following tasks: training

and mentoring the Iraqi Army and police force; securing supply routes and policing

the Iran‑Iraq border; and the ability to come to the assistance of the Iraqi Security

Forces when called upon. Then in the spring of next year – and guided as always

by the advice of our military commanders – we plan to move to a second stage of

overwatch where the coalition would maintain a more limited re‑intervention capacity

and where the main focus will be on training and mentoring.”

1425.  On 9 October, Lt Gen Houghton briefed the Chiefs of Staff that the plan for

14th Division would see “initial operating capability” by December 2007 with their

training being complete by June 2008. He also informed them of Gen Mohan’s intention

to relocate the Basra Operations Centre to Basra Air Station, a move that would

“benefit MND(SE) in terms of improved opportunities for key leader engagement, better

situational awareness and senior officer mentoring”.1305

1426.  ACM Stirrup visited Iraq from 26 to 29 October.1306 A note on his visit stated that

Maj Gen Binns was generally positive about the ISF but doubted it would have the ability

to counter JAM if the current cease-fire broke (see Section 9.6). The Deputy Brigade

Commander of 1 Mechanised Brigade told ACM Stirrup that Basra was experiencing an

increase in criminality in the wake of MNF withdrawal.

1304  House of Commons, Official Report, 8 October 2007, column 23.

1305  Minutes, 9 October 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

1306  Minute Kyd to PS/SofS [MOD], 29 October 2007, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq 26‑29 Oct 07’.

385