The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Closure of the ISG and Addendums to the

Comprehensive Report

870.  Mr Duelfer visited London on 15 October on his way back to Iraq.487 He told a

DIS official that he expected to remain in Baghdad until about Christmas to work on

the remaining unresolved issues, including cross-border movement into Syria.

871.  In his memoir, Mr Duelfer described the energy for ISG activities as “almost

completely extinguished”.488 Mr McLaughlin and the White House supported the idea

of the ISG collecting more information to “close out the remaining uncertain issues”,

including the reported movement of WMD to Syria before the invasion, but most ISG

staff were now focused on the insurgency.

872.  On 28 October, Op ROCKINGHAM reported that the ISG continued to investigate:

• remaining stocks of CBW agents;

• WMD infrastructure and associated individuals of concern; and

• the Syrian connection.489

873.  The ISG was also revisiting priority WMD-related sites to document and secure

equipment of proliferation concern.

874.  On 8 November, two US military protection officers were killed in a convoy taking

Mr Duelfer and his deputy to a meeting in Baghdad to discuss the Syrian connection.490

After the incident, the US instructed that all ISG data-gathering missions should stop.

875.  Mr Duelfer left Baghdad on 16 December.491

876.  In April 2005, the ISG published additional material as Addendums to the

Comprehensive Report.

877.  On 23 December 2004, Mr Ehrman informed Sir Nigel Sheinwald that Mr Duelfer

planned to publish a version of the Comprehensive Report with a number of new

annexes, in the second half of January.492 The UK had received four annexes for factual

checking. The key points in the annexes included:

• Residual proliferation risks from people and equipment/materials. Mr Duelfer had

concluded that the threat of proliferation of WMD skills beyond Iraq was “small”.

• The value of Iraqi detainees to the ISG investigation. If the US agreed to

publication, this could cause the most interest. The draft annex stated that

pre‑conflict intelligence on people in the WMD programme was as inaccurate

487  Minute [DIS] to DCDI, 15 October 2004, ‘Iraq/ISG: Lunch with Charles Duelfer’.

488  Duelfer C. Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Public Affairs, 2009.

489  Op ROCKINGHAM Weekly, No.70, 21-28 October 2004.

490  Op ROCKINGHAM Weekly No.74, 18-24 November 2004’.

491  Duelfer C. Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Public Affairs, 2009.

492  Minute Ehrman to Sheinwald, 23 December 2004, ‘ISG Report on Iraq WMD’.

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