9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
to UK-US
co-operation … and to mitigate damage to the domestic reputation of
the
Armed
Forces.”
1002.
Attached to
the letter was a draft speaking note for use in explaining the
policy to
the US. It
said: “it will only be possible for us to gain domestic support for
an enduring
commitment
… if we can at the same time announce that the task of our ground
troops
in Basra is
coming to an end.”
1003.
Phase II of
the Charge of the Knights began on 12 April.491
The British
Embassy
Office
Basra reported that the ISF conducted successful house-to-house
operations in
two
districts of Basra which “met little resistance and netted two
significant weapons
caches, an
IED factory and at least 15 militiamen arrested”. However, it was
“still not
clear
whether the failure of JAM to confront the army is a tactical move
or indicates a
significant
breakdown of leadership and morale in mainstream JAM”.
1004.
Mr Prentice
met Prime Minister Maliki for half an hour on 12 April and for an
hour
and a half
on the following day to discuss the UK military’s role in Basra and
the alleged
deals with
JAM.492
A record of
the discussions by a member of the Embassy’s Chancery
section
said that they were “frank and open discussions without a hint of
animosity”.
During the
first meeting, Prime Minister Maliki explained that his concerns
were:
•
information
alluding to deals between JAM and UK forces in Basra, in
particular
allegations
that UK forces had provided assurances that they would
not
intervene
and that JAM detainees had been released without informing
the
Iraqi Government;
•
lack of UK
support to the ISF in Basra – Gen Mohan believed that UK forces
had
provided
“no training and no equipment”;
•
a lack of
intelligence support on JAM’s capabilities from the
UK;
•
UK
negligence in allowing JAM to re-arm and regroup during the
“freeze”;
•
the error
of withdrawing from Basra Palace without proper consultation
which
had allowed
JAM to take control; and
•
that the UK
had prevented US helicopters flying from Basra in support of
the
Charge of
the Knights.
1005.
Mr Prentice
explained the support that UK forces had provided in Basra
while
Prime
Minister Maliki had been there.493
The
allegations that the UK had not provided
support
were untrue. Nor was there any agreement between JAM and the UK of
the sort
described.
The OMS might have attempted to drive a wedge between the UK and
the
491
eGram
14079/08 Basra to FCO London, 14 April 2008, ‘Iraq: Basra Update 14
April’.
492
Email FCO
[junior official] to Prentice, 14 April 2008, ‘Meetings with PM
Maliki: UK military’s role in
Basrah and
alleged deals with JAM’; Email FCO [junior official] to Prentice,
14 April 2008, ‘Maliki Meetings
12-13
April’.
493
Email FCO
[junior official] to Prentice, 14 April 2008, ‘Meetings with PM
Maliki: UK military’s role in
Basrah and
alleged deals with JAM’.
369