9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
900.
The following
day, the British Embassy Baghdad reported that Muqtada
al-Sadr
had issued
a statement calling for a cease-fire, which:
•
called for
an end to armed demonstrations and to “illegal arrests” and for
the
return of
those who were displaced because of the violence;
•
appealed to
the Iraqi Government to give a general pardon to and to release
all
those held
in detention, particularly those from the Sadrist
Trend;
•
disowned
all who owned weapons and used them to target
government
buildings
and institutions;
•
confirmed
that the Sadrist Trend did not possess heavy weapons;
and
•
made a
commitment to co-operation with the Iraqi Government and
institutions
in
establishing law and order and working to restore public
services.446
901.
The Embassy
reported that the Iraqi Government had welcomed
al-Sadr’s
statement
and reiterated that it was not attacking any specific group or
party, but only
those who
were breaking the law. Prime Minister Maliki had told Dr Rubaie
that he
intended to
remain in Basra for a further two or three days to complete
“cleansing
operations”
there. There would be two further unspecified security
operations:
one in a port
area and the other in a district in Basra.
902.
Questions were
asked at the MCNS meeting that evening about the
reports
of police
desertions in Baghdad and allegations of poor co-operation between
the
police and
army. The representative of the Ministry of Interior told the
Council that
“only 10 percent
of the national Police had proven ineffective” and that more
than
400 police
had been dismissed in Basra in recent days for
“disloyalty”.
903.
Mr Prentice
commented to the FCO:
“If the JAM
cease-fire proves to be real, the GoI will need to move quickly in
lifting
the curfew
and returning life … [in] Baghdad … to normal asap … The response
of
the Special
Groups to both MaS’ [Muqtada al-Sadr’s] public cease-fire and
Iran’s
encouragement
for some kind of truce, will be important in allowing normality
to
return
quickly … There is still a long way to go in Basra, both in shaping
a workable
military
plan and framing the political settlement.”
904.
In a telegram
to London issued late on 30 March, Mr Prentice considered
the
possible
outcomes to the situation in Basra, their likely result and options
for the UK’s
response.447
In his
view, the worst case scenario would involve the ISF collapsing
in
Basra and
the MNF being forced to come to their assistance. JAM would see
this as a
victory and
Prime Minister Maliki’s credibility would be damaged.
446
eGram
12023/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 31 March 2008, ‘Iraq: Baghdad:
Security and Political
Update,
Sunday 30 March’.
447
eGram
12020/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 30 March 2008, ‘Iraq:
Whither?’
347