The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
throughout
this period, believed the Iraqi line that the United States in
particular was
trying to
impose a punishment on Iraq by any means possible, that this
continued
punishment
was unjustified in the absence of clear evidence that WMD
programmes
were being
pursued and that the whole sanctions regime could be knocked
aside,
under the
force of international concern about the humanitarian situation, if
the
Russians
persisted with their tactics.”163
307.
Sir Jeremy
told the Inquiry:
“The
Russians were just not prepared, I think, in mid-2001 with a new
American
administration,
to be carried along into a recasting of the sanctions regime on
Iraq
which would
extend it without any clear measures, stepping stones, if you like,
for
how Iraq
could get out of the sanctions regime. They regarded it as
one-sided in that
respect,
whereas [resolution] 1284 had been comprehensive.”164
308.
Sir Jeremy
continued:
“They [the
Russians] held out in July, they held out in November, and we
wondered
whether we
would ever get a sanctions regime.”
309.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry why he thought the Russians had maintained
their
opposition
to a “Smart Sanctions” regime:
“The real
reason … conveyed … by senior Russians authoritatively, was that
they
were
concerned about their commercial position in Iraq and the Iraqis
actually didn’t
want any
change to the sanctions regime. The Iraqi regime was comfortable …
we
understood
that the Iraqis actually threatened to cut off all Russia’s
contracts if they
agreed to
the modification of sanctions, and the Russians were fairly open
with us
310.
The Inquiry
asked Mr Ross if the Russian attitude had affected US
policy.166
He
told
the
Inquiry:
“I think it
did … I think it built US suspicions of the Security Council as a
place to do
business …
which undermined at a critical period the US intention to use the
Council
and to use
UNMOVIC as an avenue for its policy of containing
Iraq.
“I think
they [the US] felt that … even when they were easing sanctions,
they hit a
Russian
blockage in the Security Council and that caused considerable
frustration in
Washington,
but also provided a lot of ammunition to the neo-cons and other
people
who said,
you know, ‘You can’t do anything through the UN, it is just a kind
of joke,
that place,
just forget it’ …”
163
Statement,
27 November 2009, page 3.
164
Public
hearing, 27 November 2009, pages 12-13.
165
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, page 32.
166
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, pages 30-31.
250