The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
249.
Sir David
reported that he had been clear about Mr Blair’s determination
that
Saddam
Hussein had to disarm or be disarmed; he was “obliged to
co‑operate” and
if he didn’t,
“he would be in breach and military action would
follow”.
250.
Sir David
said that Iraq’s declaration should be handled in a way “calculated
to
maintain
Coalition support and to try to secure a second resolution”. He
thought that was
possible,
but Dr Rice’s.
“…
impatience for action was much more obvious than her commitment to
secure
international
backing. She wanted to know what I thought would constitute
material
breach, and
how we could catch Saddam out if he did not trap himself through
his
own
mistakes.”
251.
Sir David
told Dr Rice that some cases would be straightforward, such
as:
“… the
discovery of VX, anthrax, or a nuclear programme … But it would be
much
more
difficult if we were dogged by a series of low‑level and less
clear‑cut acts of
obstruction
… We would then be in a grey area where it would be much harder
to
persuade
the international community to act.”
252.
Sir David
stated that the UK needed “a convincing case based on evidence.
Public
defiance by
Saddam was not the same as proving non‑compliance.” The US and
UK
“should
work hard over the next couple of months to build our case and
secure a second
resolution”.
That would comprise three strands of action:
•
Analysing
the declaration: “If Saddam failed to address the
discrepancies
identified
by UNSCOM … would immediately have a powerful argument that
the
declaration
was false and incomplete”.
•
“the
smoking gun: it was unlikely but not impossible, that we would
acquire
intelligence
that caught Saddam red‑handed …” Dr Rice thought the
chances
of that
were “very slim”.
•
“Pattern of
deceit”: building up “a comprehensive picture of
Saddam’s
obstruction
and deception. This would consist of the steady accumulation
of
examples
that might be small in themselves but would be telling when
taken
together”.
253.
Dr Rice
had agreed the US and UK should pursue those strands
and:
“… would
like to go to the Security Council around the end of January or
early
February to
make the case that Saddam was not co‑operating and the time
had
come for
military action.”
254.
Before that,
Mr Blair and President Bush “should meet to review the
evidence and
the
options”.
255.
Sir David
wrote that Dr Rice was “very irritated” about Dr Blix’s
reluctance to
interview
key individuals outside Iraq, and she was “impervious to arguments”
that those
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