The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
intelligence
that either confirms or conflicts with the information provided by
the
agent and
will put the report in context where required. This is to ensure
that the
reader is
able to make the best judgement on the veracity of the
intelligence.”263
650.
Addressing
comments “about the unreliability of ‘single-source
reporting’”,
the ISC added:
“Some …
intelligence that agents produce cannot be verified or
corroborated
by
intelligence from other sources. The professional judgement of the
agent’s
reliability
is based on all that is known about the agent and their
circumstances,
including
the reliability of information that can be verified. It is possible
to recruit
a reliable
agent with exceptional access to high-grade intelligence. Examples
…
are amongst
the most valuable agents that the UK has ever had. Each was
the
origin of
‘single‑source’ reporting from SIS. For much of the reporting there
was no
collateral from
other sources.”264
651.
The Butler
Report stated:
“Validation
of human intelligence sources after the war has thrown
doubt
on a high
proportion of those sources and of their reports, and hence on
the
quality of
the intelligence assessments received by Ministers and officials
in
the period
from summer 2002 to the outbreak of hostilities. Of the main
human
intelligence
sources described above:
•
One SIS
main source reported authoritatively on some issues, but
on
others was
passing on what he had heard within his circle.
•
Reporting
from a sub-source to a second SIS main source that was
important
to JIC assessments on Iraqi possession of chemical and
biological
weapons must be open to doubt.
•
Reports
from a third SIS main source have been withdrawn as
unreliable.
•
Reports
from two further SIS main sources continue to be
regarded
as
reliable, although it is notable that their reports were less
worrying
than the
rest about Iraqi chemical and biological weapons
capabilities.
•
Reports
received from a liaison service on Iraqi production of
biological
agent were seriously flawed, so that the grounds for
JIC
assessments
drawing on those reports that Iraq had
recently-produced
stocks of
biological agent no longer exist.”265
263
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 25.
264
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 26.
265
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
436.
406