The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

791. Mr Hoon wrote:

“A critical – and the least quantifiable – factor in weighing the two packages must

be the impact on our strategic relationship with the US. In principle, both packages

could strengthen that relationship: Package 2 alone should easily surpass any other

conceivable non‑US contribution, except perhaps that of Turkey.”

792. Mr Hoon stated that, while he had “sought to dampen” Secretary Rumsfeld’s

expectations of any sizeable land contribution, there might be disappointment that the

UK was “not prepared to put significant numbers of ground troops in harm’s way”. That

might translate into a cooler view towards our privileged links.

793. Mr Hoon added:

“A further factor which cannot be entirely discounted is the negative reaction of many

of our own military personnel – particularly in the Army – if we do not provide a land

contribution. This could find its way into the media which would be quick to draw

unfavourable comparisons between our contribution to this campaign and the Gulf

Conflict in 1990/91.”

794. Mr Hoon stated that an offer of Package 3 “must be subject to conditions”:

• The UK would be dependent on US help to secure Turkey’s agreement to the

UK deployment.

• The UK “must be fully involved in developing the final plan on which a final

decision to deploy would be based”.

• The UK would want US help to reconstitute stocks, particularly of smart

weapons.

795. A detailed MOD paper attached to Mr Hoon’s minute set out the factors Ministers

would “need to take into account” in coming to a decision and the detailed composition

of the force packages, which was largely based on Mr Johnson’s minute to Mr Hoon of

11 October.

796. Mr Hoon also sent his minute to Mr Brown, Mr Straw and Sir Andrew Turnbull.

797. The Chiefs of Staff meeting on 16 October was informed that a Ministerial decision

on the likely UK contribution was expected the following day.313

798. Lt Gen Pigott provided updates on US planning and UK strategy.

799. Adm Boyce commented that the UK position on support for US action “had to be

clear”, and that a “distinction between supporting the US with basing in Diego Garcia

and the deployment of personnel into any battlespace was academic”.

313 Minutes, 16 October 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

296