13.1 |
Resources
55.
In a paper
prepared for the meeting, the Cabinet Office invited Ministers to
“note
the
potentially long lead times involved in equipping UK Armed Forces
to undertake
operations
in the Iraqi theatre and agree that MOD should bring forward
proposals for
the
procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements”.48
56.
The record of
the meeting produced by Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s
Private
Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, included the conclusions that:
“•
We should
work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any
military
action. But
we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take
any
firm
decisions …
•
The Prime
Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be
spent
in
preparation for this operation.”49
57.
Mr Rycroft’s
record of the meeting was sent to the participants
only.
58.
Mr Campbell
described the meeting in his diaries.50
He recalled
that Mr Blair had
said that
“he did not want any discussions with any other departments at this
stage …
He meant
the Treasury.”
59.
Mr Rycroft
told the Inquiry that Mr Blair followed up the question of
funding for
preparing
for an operation through “separate contacts” with
Mr Brown.51
Mr Rycroft
agreed with
the Inquiry that, due to the nature of the relationship between
Mr Blair and
Mr Brown,
matters involving Mr Brown were usually handled personally by
Mr Blair,
rather than
through a letter or note to the Treasury. Mr Rycroft told the
Inquiry that the
use of that
personal channel did not imply that Mr Brown was not aligned
with UK policy.
60.
The MOD
provided No.10 with advice on options for a UK contribution to
US‑led
military
operations in Iraq on 26 July (see Section 6.1).52
61.
The advice
defined three options:
•
Package 1 –
an “in‑place support package” using forces already in the
region;
•
Package 2 –
an “enhanced support package” comprising Package 1
with
additional
air and maritime forces; and
•
Package 3 –
a “discrete UK package” based on deployment of an
armoured
division,
in addition to the forces in Package 2.
62.
Those three
options provided the broad framework for discussions within the
UK
Government
until the end of 2002.
48
Paper
Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military
Action’.
49
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July’.
50
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries.
Volume 4.
The Burden of Power: Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
51
Private
hearing, 10 September 2010, pages 31-32.
52
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
455