17  |  Civilian casualties

4.  The Inquiry received a number of substantive submissions relating to the human cost

of the conflict in Iraq, including from:

• Mr Hamit Dardagan and Professor John Sloboda for the Iraq Body Count (IBC)

project.1 The IBC project aims to record the violent civilian deaths that have

resulted from the 2003 military intervention in Iraq. In its submission to the

Inquiry, IBC argued that the Inquiry should take full and proper account of Iraqi

casualties resulting from the conflict and the subsequent breakdown in security.

It continued: “One of the most important questions in situations of armed conflict

and in the laws of war is whether the use of force has been a proportionate

response to the threat that prompted it … It is impossible to establish the

wisdom of actions taken … if the full consequences in human welfare are not

taken into account. Casualty data are perhaps the most glaring indication of the

full costs of war.”

• Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).2 AOAV is a non‑governmental organisation

(NGO) which aims to reduce the incidence and impact of global armed violence.

In its submission to the Inquiry, AOAV argued that the UK Government actively

sought to maintain a position of ignorance regarding measurements of death,

injury and deprivation resulting from violence in Iraq. It proposed that the UK

Government should establish a structured process to undertake transparent

measurement and monitoring of the impact of armed violence where its Armed

Forces are active.

5.  The Inquiry is grateful for these, and other, submissions, and has taken account of

them in preparing its Report.

Consideration of Iraqi civilian casualties before the conflict

Statements on the human cost of not intervening in Iraq

6.  The UK Government dossier Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment

of the British Government was published on 24 September 2002.3 The dossier is

considered in detail in Section 4.2.

7.  Eight of the dossier’s 50 pages considered life in Iraq under Saddam Hussein,

describing his security apparatus, internal repression, external wars and abuse of

human rights.

8.  The dossier’s Executive Summary indicated the purpose of that material:

“But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the [Weapons of Mass

Destruction – WMD] capabilities we have described. It arises also because of the

1  Dardagan and Sloboda, 26 August 2006, Iraqi casualties must form part of Britain’s Iraq Inquiry.

2 Action on Armed Violence, July 2010, A State of Ignorance.

3  Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September 2002.

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