The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The Special
Commission was “not prepared to tell the truth by announcing
that
the main
task entrusted to it … has been completed”.
•
That was
“an illegal” and “tendentious political position” which was “not
based on
any
scientific or technical foundation”.
•
The US and
UK had refused to acknowledge when there was a technical
basis
for closing
a file and had “obstructed practically any step which the
Security
Council
attempted to take in the direction of achieving justice and
equity”.
•
That had
happened in July in relation to the nuclear file.
•
Iraq’s
warnings on 1 May, 17 July and 30 July had not been
heeded.
555.
Mr Annan
wrote that he had been contacted by Secretary Albright and
Mr Samuel
(Sandy)
Berger, the US National Security Advisor, who insisted that Iraq’s
stance was
an attack
on the UN and on Mr Annan’s own position as it was his MOU
that had been
violated.222
His
response to the “standoff” was to propose “a comprehensive review
of
the UN’s
relationship with Iraq, including the role of UNSCOM”. The US had
opposed
such a move
on the grounds that it was “bargaining” with Saddam Hussein,
but:
“… the
broader Council, including the UK, understood the value of engaging
the
Iraqis in a
process whereby they would come back into compliance and we
would
set out on
a path to a conclusion rather than permanent crisis.”
556.
On
11 August, Dr ElBaradei confirmed that, as a result of Iraq’s
decision, the
IAEA was
carrying out limited monitoring and verification tasks which fell
“far short
of full
implementation of the OMV plan” and resulted in a “significantly
reduced level
of assurance”
which could be provided for the Council.223
557.
On
12 August, Mr Butler reported that Iraq’s decision had
brought “to a halt” all
UNSCOM’s
disarmament activities, including discussions at the political and
technical
level, and
monitoring activities were “limited to sites previously declared by
Iraq or
designated
by the Commission”. UNSCOM fully shared the IAEA’s conclusions on
the
impact on
its ability to provide assurance.224
558.
The President
of the Security Council responded to both letters on
18 August,
stating
that the members of the Council noted “with concern that Iraq’s
decision to
222
Annan
K. Interventions:
A Life In War And Peace. Allen Lane,
2012.
223
UN Security
Council, 18 August 1998, ‘Letter dated 11 August 1998
from the Director General of the
International
Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security
Council’ (S/1998/766).
224
UN Security
Council, 18 August 1998, ‘Letter dated 12 August 1988
from the Executive Chairman of
the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security
Council
resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security
Council’ (S/1998/767).
126