The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
945.
Cabinet was
provided with the text of Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer
to
Baroness
Ramsey setting out the legal basis for military
action.
946.
That
document represented a statement of the Government’s legal
position
– it did
not explain the legal basis of the conclusion that Iraq had failed
to take
“the final
opportunity” to comply with its disarmament obligations offered
by
resolution
1441.
947.
Lord
Goldsmith told Cabinet that it was “plain” that Iraq had failed to
comply
with its
obligations and continued to be in “material breach” of the
relevant
Security
Council resolutions. The authority to use force under resolution
678 was,
“as a
result”, revived. Lord Goldsmith said that there was no need for a
further
resolution.
948.
Cabinet was
not provided with written advice which set out, as the
advice
of 7 March
had done, the conflicting arguments regarding the legal effect
of
resolution
1441 and whether, in particular, it authorised military action
without
a further
resolution of the Security Council.
949.
Cabinet was
not provided with, or informed of, Mr Brummell’s letter
to
Mr Rycroft
of 14 March; or Mr Rycroft’s response of 15 March. Cabinet was
not
told how
Mr Blair had reached the view recorded in Mr Rycroft’s
letter.
950.
The
majority of Cabinet members who gave evidence to the Inquiry
took
the
position that the role of the Attorney General on 17 March was,
simply, to tell
Cabinet
whether or not there was a legal basis for military
action.
951.
None of
those Ministers who had read Lord Goldsmith’s 7 March
advice
asked for
an explanation as to why his legal view of resolution 1441 had
changed.
952.
There was
little appetite to question Lord Goldsmith about his advice,
and
no substantive
discussion of the legal issues was recorded.
953.
Cabinet was
not misled on 17 March and the exchange of letters
between
the
Attorney General’s office and No.10 on 14 and 15 March did not
constitute,
as suggested
to the Inquiry by Ms Short, a “side deal”.
954.
Cabinet
was, however, being asked to confirm the decision that
the
diplomatic
process was at an end and that the House of Commons should
be
asked to
endorse the use of military action to enforce Iraq’s compliance.
Given
the gravity
of this decision, Cabinet should have been made aware of the
legal
uncertainties.
955.
Lord
Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice
which
fully
reflected the position on 17 March, explained the legal basis on
which the
UK could
take military action and set out the risks of legal
challenge.
168