6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
487.
Gen Franks had
said that “the British forces with whom he had talked had
made
this clear
to him”. There were a variety of roles which could be assigned to
units under
his command
and “it was not yet necessary to clarify the final plan”. He would
be in
a better
position to do so in seven to 10 days (5 to 8 March).
488.
Mr Hoon asked
whether the UK role would only be determined after
offensive
action had
started. Gen Franks said that was not the case but he had to have
early
flexible
options in case there was a requirement to move before the armour
was ready.
He
“understood the strategic requirement for a UK profile in any
operation”.
489.
On 28
February, Mr Hoon’s Private Office sent Sir David Manning an update
on
military
planning.166
With
respect to post-conflict operations, it warned that the UK
was
“currently
at risk of taking on a very substantial commitment” that it would
have “great
difficulty
in sustaining beyond the immediate conclusion of conflict”. That is
addressed
in detail
in Section 6.5.
490.
On 4 March,
Lt Gen Reith advocated an expanded combat role for UK
forces
to the
Chiefs of Staff.
491.
On 4 March, Lt
Gen Reith sent the Chiefs of Staff two papers setting out
proposals
for
employing UK land forces on combat missions with or without “a
dedicated ‘UK box’”
based on
“the agreed 1(UK) Div AO”.167
492.
Lt Gen Reith
explained that a “UK box” would “allow UK forces to move first
in
a ground
offensive and thereby set the conditions for the ‘exemplary
performance’
in Phase
IV”, but US resistance to the creation of a UK box would “probably
only be
overcome by
high level intervention”.
493.
Lt Gen Reith
asked the Chiefs of Staff whether, in those circumstances, he
should
“explore
integration of UK niche elements into US planning on a task, time
and space
limited
basis”, or whether “the ‘exemplary performance’ for Phase IV should
override
opportunities
to make a significant contribution to Coalition Phase III
operations”.
494.
In the first
of the two papers, Lt Gen Reith set out:
•
1 (UK)
Div’s mission was likely to be “to attack to defeat enemy forces
within
boundaries,
secure key oil infrastructure and seize Umm Qasr port to
prevent
or mitigate
environmental disaster and enable humanitarian
operations”.
Subsequently
the UK division would relieve US forces to support their
rapid
movement
north.
166
Letter
Williams to Manning, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning and
Preparation’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning Update – 28 February
2003’.
167
Minute
Reith to COSSEC, 4 March 2003, ‘Op Telic Employment of UK forces’
attaching Paper CJO, 3
March 2003,
‘Op TELIC Land Options for 1(UK) Armoured Division – Update’ and
Paper CJO, 4 March
2003, ‘Op
TELIC Land Options for 1(UK) Armoured Division – Alternative
Options’.
461