1.1 | UK Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000

items, the only conclusion was that there was “a high risk that they had been purchased

and in part used for proscribed activities”.82

186. Mr Ekéus told the Inquiry that he was able to make that report as a result of the

work of UNSCOM scientists, including Dr David Kelly.83

187. On 1 July 1995, as part of a further “full, final, and complete disclosure (FFCD)” of

its capabilities, Iraq admitted for the first time to the production of bulk biological agent,

but not to its weaponisation.84

188. In July 1995, dual-use items were rendered harmless or destroyed, “under strong

protest from Iraq”. In November 1995, Iraq acknowledged that the items had been

specifically procured for and used in proscribed activities.85

189. Mr Ekéus told the Inquiry that, in 1995, Mr Aziz had asked him to approach

Mr Tony Lake, US National Security Advisor, to offer, on Mr Aziz’s behalf, “high quality

information about activity and planning inside terrorist networks” in exchange for an

accommodating attitude on the easing of sanctions against Iraq.86 Mr Lake declined.

190. On 8 August 1995, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, Lieutenant General Hussein

Kamil, the former Minister of Industry and Head of Iraq’s Military Industrialisation

Corporation defected to Jordan. He had been responsible for the development and

manufacture of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes.

191. Lt Gen Kamil met Mr Ekéus and two other officials from the IAEA and UNSCOM

and an interpreter in Amman.87 Lt Gen Kamil said that, after inspections had started,

Iraq had destroyed its biological weapons and he himself had ordered the destruction of

Iraq’s chemical weapons. In addition, all Iraq’s SCUD missiles and their components had

been destroyed, although two launchers had been dismantled and hidden. Lt Gen Kamil

also referred to a nuclear project that inspectors were not aware of, at the Sodash site,

where equipment had been buried.

192. Mr Tim Dowse, Chief of the Assessments Staff from 2003 to 2009, told the Inquiry

that Lt Gen Kamil had claimed that:

82 UN Security Council, 10 April 1995, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the

implementation of the Special Commission’s plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s

compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)’ (S/1995/284).

83 Statement Ekéus, 23 April 2011, page 3.

84 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 25 January 1999 from the Executive Chairman of the Special

Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council

resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/1999/94), Annex C.

85 UN Security Council, 11 October 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special

Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991)’

(S/1996/848).

86 Statement Ekéus, 23 April 2011, page 6.

87 Note Smidovich, [undated], ‘Note for the File’.

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