The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
262.
The Chiefs of
Staff had also considered a “CBRN Risk Paper” on
6 November
and the key
equipment issues arising were covered in Lt Gen Pigott’s UOR
update on
18 November.128
The time
needed to procure additional COLPRO under UOR action
was
“directly related to the amount of equipment required” and it was
possible that the
quantity
which could be procured and fielded against “the most demanding
timeframe
may be
insufficient to meet the full requirement”. That could have an
impact upon the
UK’s
concept of operations (CONOPS). Options would be presented to the
Chiefs of
Staff “once
the extent of the likely shortfall” was confirmed.
263.
Lt Gen
Pigott reported that 20 UORs had been approved to date, and a
further
137 USURs
endorsed. The latest ISD being used to gauge the delivery of UORs
was
the end
of February for Packages 1 and 2 and the end of March for Package
3.
264.
There were
some key equipment gaps “that may not be fully addressed by
the
UOR process
and for which Chiefs of Staff’s direction on prioritisation and
risk may be
required”,
including:
•
ECBA – “ …
it is possible we may not be able to procure sufficient
numbers
within the
timeframe; this may necessitate differential levels of force
protection”.
•
Desert
clothing and boots – “It is likely that the numbers required will
exceed
the UK’s
manufacturing capability. There are operational, force health
and
presentational
implications in not providing troops with appropriate
clothing.”
265.
Options would
be presented to the Chiefs of Staff once procurement timelines
had
been
confirmed with industry.
266.
Maj Gen Fry
advised Adm Boyce on 22 November that it would take some
four
months from
the order to deploy for the northern option (whether Package 2 or
3), and
more than
five months for the southern option.129
267.
A DCRS
official informed Mr Hoon on 22 November that contracts
were shortly to
be let for
clothing, combat boots and body armour, and the procurement of
these items
would be
highly visible.130
The
official wrote that the “continuing uncertainty over the
size
of the
operation” meant that, initially, the procurement figures would
be:
•
clothing
for 15,000 personnel;
•
20,000
pairs of desert boots; and
•
50,000 body
armour plates.
128
Minute
DCDS(C) to COS, 18 November 2002, ‘Iraq Contingency Planning –
Urgent Operational
Requirements
and Related Issues’.
129
Minute
DCJO(Ops) to PSO/CDS, 22 November 2002, ‘Potential Operations
in Iraq – Northern and
Southern
Timelines’.
130
Report DCRS
1 to APS/SofS [MOD], 22 November 2002, ‘Potential Operations
in Iraq: Letting of
Contracts
for Combat Clothing/Body Armour’.
40