7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
•
Dr Mohamed
ElBaradei, Director General of the International
Atomic
Energy
Agency (IAEA), reported that the IAEA had found no
evidence
of ongoing
prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq
although
a number
of issues were still under investigation.62
155.
In the
subsequent debate, members of the Security Council voiced
widely
divergent
views.
156.
Mr Annan
concluded that there were real differences on strategy and timing
in
the Security
Council. Iraq’s non-co-operation was insufficient to bring members
to agree
that war
was justified; they would only move if they came to their own
judgement that
inspections
were pointless.63
157.
On
19 February, Mr Blair sent President Bush a six-page
Note. He proposed
focusing on
the absence of full co-operation and a “simple” resolution stating
that Iraq
had failed
to take the final opportunity, with a side statement defining tough
tests of
co‑operation
and a vote on 14 March to provide a deadline for
action.64
158.
President Bush
and Mr Blair agreed to introduce a draft resolution at the UN
the
following
week but its terms were subject to further
discussion.65
159.
On
20 February, Mr Blair told Dr Blix that he wanted to
offer the US an alternative
strategy
which included a deadline and tests for compliance.66
He did not
think Saddam
Hussein
would co-operate but he would try to get Dr Blix as much time as
possible. Iraq
could have
signalled a change of heart in the December declaration. The
Americans did
not think
that Saddam was going to co-operate: “Nor did he. But we needed to
keep the
international
community together.”
160.
Dr Blix stated
that full co-operation was a nebulous concept; and a deadline
of
15 April
would be too early. Dr Blix commented that “perhaps there was not
much WMD
in Iraq
after all”. Mr Blair responded that “even German and French
intelligence were
sure that
there was WMD in Iraq”. Dr Blix said they seemed “unsure” about
“mobile BW
production
facilities”: “It would be paradoxical and absurd if 250,000 men
were to invade
Iraq and
find very little.”
161.
Mr Blair
responded that “our intelligence was clear that Saddam had
reconstituted
his WMD
programme”.
62
UN Security
Council, ‘4707th Meeting Friday 14 February 2003’
(S/PV.4707).
63
Telegram
268 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 February 2003, ‘Foreign
Secretary’s Meeting
with the
UN Secretary-General: 14 February’.
64
Letter
Manning to Rice, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq’ attaching
Note [Blair to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
65
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq and MEPP: Prime
Minister’s Telephone
Conversation
with Bush, 19 February’.
66
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Blix’.
591