3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
if we
have to occupy … Iraq”. He did not “want to make too much of this”
but wondered
if it
suggested “a new wariness at the heart of the [US]
Administration”.
754.
Cabinet was
informed on 31 October that a UN resolution was likely to
be
agreed the
following week.
755.
On 31 October,
Mr Straw told the Cabinet that the Security Council was in
the
final stages
of the negotiation of a resolution on Iraq.255
The text
would need to meet
French
concerns that it would not provide a pretext for war and UK and US
concerns to
avoid too
restrictive a formulation on what would follow an Iraqi breach of
the resolution.
The most
likely outcome was a resolution the following week. The pressure to
reach
closure was
“growing”.
756.
In discussion
the need for the inspection regime to be tough and for
existing
defects to
be rectified, and for the resolution to provide for further
discussion in the
Security
Council, were raised.
757.
Mr Blair
concluded that a “robust resolution was required which would send a
clear
message to
Saddam Hussein. If Iraq did not comply there would be further
discussion
in the
… Security Council of the next steps.”
758.
Mr Straw
told Mr Ivanov on 1 November that if Iraq did not comply, the
draft
resolution
meant the issue would “have to go back to the Security Council
to
decide what
action was required”.
759.
In a
conversation with Mr Straw on 1 November, Mr Ivanov
stated that efforts
should be
concentrated on two sets of questions:
•
The
provisions in the resolution on inspection procedures should
reflect the
views of
Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei. In his view, that would be
“difficult, but
feasible”.
•
What
happened in the event that a resolution was
violated.256
760.
Mr Ivanov
was reported to be content for the resolution to contain
references
to previous
material breaches:
“But the
resolution had to be careful about future material breaches. He did
not want
a situation
where military action could be automatically sanctioned without
further
reference
to the Security Council.”
255
Cabinet
Conclusions, 31 October 2002.
256
Telegram
583 from FCO London to Washington, 1 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s
Conversation
with Russian Foreign Minister, 1 November’.
331