The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
139.
The review of
post‑conflict planning and preparation that began in 2003
was
triggered
by the Iraq experience, but was not designed to provide immediate
solutions to
the
problems encountered in Iraq.
140.
On the
evidence seen by the Inquiry, the Government quickly identified
lessons
learned
from the shortcomings in its planning and preparation for
post‑conflict Iraq and
the initial
experience of post‑conflict reconstruction. It failed, however, to
apply those
lessons in
Iraq.
141.
There is no
indication that Ministers or officials considered how the PCRU
might
support
operations in Iraq until autumn 2005.
142.
PCRU support
was essential to the establishment and operation of the Basra
PRT
during
2006. The PCRU did not, however, have a mandate to overcome the
difficulties
caused by
variations in the contracts and terms and conditions of PRT staff,
most of
whom were
transferred from existing roles in Iraq (see Section
10.3).
143.
After 2006,
there were further changes to the UK’s strategic approach
to
reconstruction
and stabilisation and improvements to its deployable
capability.
144.
It is not
possible to determine how the structures and capabilities
introduced by
successive
governments would have performed in the circumstances that existed
either
in
Whitehall during the planning and preparation for a post‑Saddam
Hussein Iraq in 2002
and early
2003, or in Whitehall and Iraq between 2003 and 2009.
145.
The size and
scope of the Stabilisation Unit and the resources at its disposal
in
2016 far
exceed anything available to the UK in 2003.
146.
The strategic
direction established through the BSOS and new
cross‑government
machinery
centred on the National Security Council, have created an
improved
framework
for constructing an integrated civilian‑military approach to
post‑conflict
strategy,
planning, preparation and implementation.
147.
The Box below
lists some of the lessons learned from reviews of the UK
approach
to
stabilisation since 2009, described in greater detail in Section
10.3.
550