3.3 | Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002

• The US should take action within a multilateral framework with international

support, not unilateral action.

• The need for a public information campaign explaining the nature of Saddam

Hussein’s regime and the threat he posed.

• Any military action would need to be within the framework of international law.

• The military strategy would need to ensure Saddam Hussein could be removed

quickly and successfully.

• A convincing “blueprint” for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq was needed which

would be acceptable to both Iraq’s population and its neighbours.

• Persuading the US to take the Middle East Peace Process seriously to give

justice to Palestine, to ensure support for military action in the region, and

to avoid accusations of double standards.

• Action should enhance rather than diminish regional stability.

• Success in Afghanistan would reinforce the benefits of regime change.

216. In his discussions with President Bush at Crawford in April 2002, Mr Blair set out

a number of key elements for a successful strategy towards Iraq which would secure

international support for any military action.

217. In numerous references in documents written between April and July 2002 to

“conditions”, these were described in different ways by different people at different times.

218. As is clear from his response to Mr Hoon’s minute of 31 May, Mr Blair considered

that he was seeking to influence US policy by describing key elements for a successful

strategy to secure international support for any military action against Iraq.104

219. FCO officials identified high risks which might arise from military action and

three conditions which it regarded as essential for UK participation in such action.

220. Following a meeting on 9 July, Mr McKane circulated an outline framework for a

Cabinet Office paper for Ministers, and invited contributions from the MOD, the FCO

and the Assessments Staff.105

221. Mr Chaplin advised Mr Straw’s Private Office on 12 July that the Cabinet Office

paper would “focus on the need to persuade the US Administration to put their military

planning in a broader political context”.106

222. Mr Chaplin wrote that, as Mr Straw’s minute to Mr Blair of 8 July had noted,

“fundamental UK interests in the region” were at stake. Mr Chaplin stated that he was

“less gloomy than some of our Ambassadors about the consequences of military action”,

but the risks were “high”.

104 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Hoon to Prime Minister, 31 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.

105 Minute McKane to Chaplin, 10 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

106 Minute Chaplin to Private Secretary [FCO], 12 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Action’.

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