The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1391.
The annotated
agenda for the second round of talks on post-conflict issues
in
Washington
on 22 January 2003 asked to what extent Iraqis should be replaced
with
international
civilian staff in an interim administration.609
Many
ministries might be turned
around with
“a few changes at the top”.
1392.
Briefing for
Mr Hoon’s discussion of post-conflict issues with Dr Rice
and
Secretary
Rumsfeld on 12 February listed eight “Key Gaps/US-UK policy
differences”
on post-conflict
planning, including on de-Ba’athification:
“Is it the
US aim to de-Saddam, or de-Ba’ath Iraq? If the latter, how much of
the
party
structure do we wish to remove? In the short term, and in the long
term? What
level of
compromise/co-operation with Iraqi officialdom will be necessary
and/or
acceptable
in the early stages of Phase IV? Depending on the US intention, can
they
provide UK
forces with means of identifying particular officials for removal
from office
or
detention? How will the Coalition process those removed from
office? … How will
government
functions be maintained if key officials are
removed?”610
1393.
The 19
February JIC Assessment ‘Southern Iraq: What’s in Store?’ stated
that
the only
networks of influence in the South outside the Ba’ath Party were
the tribes and
the
followers of some senior Shia clerics.611
The
external opposition would try to assert
authority,
but only those with armed forces on the ground or support from
senior Shia
clerics
were likely to succeed to any extent.
1394.
Advice to
Mr Blair on 25 February 2003 stated that “a relatively
competent
Iraqi civil
service” should continue to function “with changes at the
highest
level only”.
1395.
In advice to
Mr Blair on 25 February, the FCO stated:
“We believe
that, contrary to the assumptions sometimes made, the
Transitional
Administration
will be able to draw on a relatively competent Iraqi civil
service.
The Iraqi
civil service has continued to function through several regime
changes,
and we see
no reason why it should not do so again, with changes at the
highest
1396.
The FCO made
no reference to the absence of agreement with the US on
the
extent of
de-Ba’athification.
1397.
The DIS paper
on “the ‘post-Saddam’ political and security environment”
in
Basra,
produced on 11 March, described the Ba’ath Party as “Basra’s most
important
administrative
institution”.613
609
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day-After Issues’.
610
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 February 2003,
‘Secretary of State’s Visit to
Washington:
Iraq.’
611
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s in
Store?’
612
Letter
Sinclair to Rycroft, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Political and
Military Questions’.
613
Report DIS,
11 March 2003, ‘Basra: Post Saddam Governance’.
556