Executive
Summary
419.
Cabinet on 17
March 2003 noted Mr Blair’s conclusion that “the diplomatic
process
was at an
end; Saddam Hussein would be given an ultimatum to leave Iraq;
and the
House of
Commons would be asked to endorse the use of military action
against Iraq to
enforce
compliance, if necessary”.
420.
In Section 5
of the Report, the Inquiry concludes that Lord Goldsmith should
have
been asked
to provide written advice which fully reflected the position on 17
March and
explained
the legal basis on which the UK could take military action and set
out the risks
of legal
challenge.
421.
There was no
substantive discussion of the military options, despite
promises
by Mr Blair,
before the meeting on 17 March.
422.
In his
statement for the Inquiry, Mr Hoon wrote that by the time he
joined Cabinet,
in
1999:
“... the
pattern of the organisation and format of Cabinet meetings was ...
well
established.
Tony Blair was well known to be extremely concerned about
leaks
from
Cabinet discussions ... It was my perception that, largely as a
consequence
of this,
he did not normally expect key decisions to be made in the course
of
Cabinet meetings.
Papers were submitted to the Cabinet Office, and in turn
by
the
Cabinet Office to appropriate Cabinet Committees for
decisions.”195
“At no time
when I was serving in the Ministry of Defence were other
Cabinet
Ministers
involved in discussions about the deployment of specific forces
and
the nature
of their operations. Relevant details would have been circulated
to
10 Downing
Street or other Government departments as necessary ... I do
not
recall a
single Cabinet level discussion of specific troop deployments and
the
nature of
their operations.”196
424.
The Inquiry
recognises that there will be operational constraints on
discussion
of the
details of military deployments, but that would not preclude the
discussion of
the principles
and the implications of military options.
425.
In January
2006, the Cabinet discussed the proposal to deploy military
forces
to Helmand
later that year.
426.
The Inquiry
also recognises that the nature of foreign policy, as the Report
vividly
demonstrates,
requires the Prime Minister of the UK, the Foreign Secretary and
their
most senior
officials to be involved in negotiating and agreeing policy on a
day‑by‑day,
and
sometimes hour‑by‑hour basis.
195
Statement,
2 April 2015, page 1.
196
Statement,
2 April 2015, page 2.
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