The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
799.
The 6 November
edition of the SPG paper on UK military strategic
thinking
included a
rewritten section on the “Aftermath-Resolution Phase” that
highlighted the
strategic
significance of the post-conflict phase of operations:
“The
lasting impression of Coalition legitimacy and success will not be
set by military
success in
conflict – it will be determined by the nature of the Iraqi nation
that
emerges
afterwards.
“This phase
has the potential to prove the most protracted and costly phase of
all.
“Planning
must be flexible to accommodate a wide range of start states and
possible
outcomes
ranging from fast and bloodless coup, a rapid and anarchic
collapse, or a
damaged and
ungoverned state on the verge of disintegration.
“Operations
in Iraq may have a negative impact on the UK’s policy objectives
for
international
terrorism, as poor handling of a post-conflict Iraq has the
potential to
increase
greatly anti-Western feeling in the region; fuelling the very
international
tensions we
have sought to diffuse and arming the forces of
extremism.”392
800.
The SPG paper
listed four policy “pillars” needed to bring about the desired
end
state,
“each composed of a range of lines of operation for different
ministries, agencies
and NGOs”:
judiciary and law; society and economy; governance; and
security.
“The
Pillars only serve a purpose if they form the basis for interaction
and co-
operation
between OGDs. The MOD can define some lines of operation in
isolation,
but early
consultation is necessary for coherence.
“Action is
in hand by Cabinet Office to develop UK thinking.
“From an
MOD perspective, ideally OGDs should be invited to agree the
policy
pillars and
outline their lines of operation within them, noting where they may
seek
assistance
from, or interaction with, the military.”
802.
The SPG
advised that, because of the US lead on military operations, much
of
the policy
on post-conflict issues was likely to reflect US aims and
principles. Early
assessment
of areas of potential difference was the key to avoiding UK
principles being
compromised.
Governance and reform might be critical areas.
803.
In the absence
of an agreed US position on the post-conflict role of the UN,
the
SPG judged
it “probable” the UK would accept: “an initial brief period of
Coalition-run,
largely
military government; followed by an interim government run by
either a UN
international
appointee or a UN approved Iraqi; leading to
self-government”.
392
Paper
[SPG], 6 November 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
248