The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The
requirement in Iraq was for paramilitary style policing. A plan was
now in place
but it
would take time to deliver. There was also a funding gap in the
Global Conflict
Prevention
Pool that would need to be addressed.”
745.
On judicial
reform, the minutes indicated that the discussion focused on
the
arrangements
for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) rather than on the wider
criminal court
system. The
Committee agreed that the UK “needed to concentrate on seeing
progress
on the
judicial process including the IST, and the police”.
746.
Mr Blair
wrote to President Bush on 27 June, to share concerns raised with
him by
Ms Clwyd
during her recent visit to Iraq.688
On the IST,
Mr Blair wrote:
“Our people
are already working together on plans to help build the capacity of
the
Iraq
Special Tribunal. We are making some progress, but there is much
still to be
done. A
credible IST process which delivers – and is seen to deliver –
justice for the
appalling
crimes of the previous regime will have major political impact … We
may
need to
make sure, however, that they do not rush to try the most serious
cases
before they
are ready.”
747.
The discussion
at DOP(I) on 7 July under the item “Progress on the Iraqi
Special
Tribunal
(IST) and judicial issues” focused exclusively on the
IST.689
In April
2004, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) had been
established (see Box,
‘An Iraqi
intelligence service’, earlier in this Section).690
On 15 July
2004, Prime Minister Allawi announced the creation of a new
intelligence
organisation
– the General Security Directorate – that reported to the
IMOD.691
General
Luck’s Review in January 2005 assessed the intelligence structures
as very weak
and in need
of a fundamental overhaul.692
In May
2005, the Criminal Intelligence Unit was established in Basra as
part of an MOI
project. It
reported directly to the MOI and was structured similarly to the US
FBI.693
The
National Information and Intelligence Agency (NIIA) was re‑named
the National
Information
and Investigations Agency in September 2005.694
688
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 27 June 2005, ‘Iraq’ attaching
Note Blair
to Bush, [undated], ‘Note from the
Prime
Minister to President Bush’.
689
Minutes, 8
July 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
690
Minute Dodd
to Quarrey, 30 April 2004, ‘Iraqi Security Force
Capabilities’.
691
BBC
News, 15 July
2004, Iraqi PM
vows to crush insurgents.
692
Telegram 58
Baghdad to FCO London, 21 January 2005, ‘Iraq: ISF Assessment Team
Visit’.
693
Email Innes
to FCO [junior official], 4 July 2005, ‘Basra:
Police’.
694
Minute
Smith, 11 September 2005, ‘Weekly Report – Week Ending Sunday
11th
September
2005’.
222