The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“If at a
second stage the Council authorises the use of force, or uses
language
which
revives the authorisation given by SCR 678 … the position will be
relatively
straightforward.
“If,
however, the Council is unable to take a decision at the second
stage, whether
because
there are insufficient votes for another resolution, or a
resolution is vetoed,
there will
be nothing to point to by way of revival of the authorisation to
use force
given in
SCR 678. We have previously noted that this is not a judgment to be
made
unilaterally
by individual Member States.”
805.
Mr Wood
also addressed the position if the Security Council failed to act
in
response to
a further material breach by Iraq:
“The
position that could arise if the Council ‘fails to act’ was …
addressed, in
hypothetical
terms, by the then Law Officers in November 1997. After
concluding
that in
circumstances then prevailing an essential precondition for the use
of force
was
appropriate action by the Council, the Law Officers went on to say
that they ‘did
not exclude
the possibility’ (though they reached no firm conclusion) that
exceptional
circumstances
could arise in which it was generally accepted by the
international
community
as a whole that Iraq had in effect repudiated the cease‑fire
and
that
a
resort to
military force to deal with the consequences of Iraq’s conduct was
the only
way to
ensure compliance.
“Too much
should not be read into this … The possibility raised in 1997 has
not been
relied upon
and is not based on authority or precedent. In any event, the
situation
envisaged
was a very narrow one where the international community as a
whole
favoured
action but the Council decided not to act.”
806.
Copies of
Mr Wood’s letter were sent to FCO officials and to
Mr Iain Macleod,
Legal
Counsellor, in the UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New
York.
807.
Lord Goldsmith
saw the letter.275
808.
Lord Goldsmith
addressed the issue of an “unreasonable” veto in his
advice
to Mr Blair
of 14 January 2003 (see Section 5).
809.
There is no
record of Lord Goldsmith’s conversation with Mr Straw on 7
November.
810.
In preparation
for the conversation, Ms Adams advised Lord Goldsmith:
“… the main
purpose … was to make clear to the Foreign Secretary that he
should
not take it
for granted that ‘it will be alright on the
night’.”276
275
Manuscript
comment Adams to AG, 6 November 2002, on Minute Wood to PS [FCO],
6 November
2002,
‘Iraq: Legal Basis for the Possible Use of Force’.
276
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 7 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the
Foreign Secretary’.
338