The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
331.
The paper
recommended a combination of carrots and sticks. Proposed
incentives
were:
•
immunity
from prosecution;
•
personal
security;
•
financial
security; and
•
job
security.
332.
The Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) de-Ba’athification
programme
(see Section
11) and the dissolution of Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus
was
“a strong
perverse incentive for anyone affected … not
to
co-operate with the Coalition”.
333.
The paper
stated that the threat of prosecution in the Iraqi courts for
concealing
evidence
might be sufficient to encourage personnel to come
forward.
334.
The paper
highlighted the need for:
•
a public
information campaign explaining how people should get in
touch;
•
facilities
in Iraq to receive, filter and interview personnel;
and
•
an ISG
ability to respond quickly to credible information. Looting and
arson could
already
have destroyed valuable evidence.
335.
On
5 June, at Sir David Manning’s request, Sir Richard Dearlove
sent No.10 an
outline for
Mr Blair on “what SIS will do additionally over the next six
to eight weeks to
uncover
evidence of Iraqi WMD”.162
336.
Sir Richard
hoped that, by the end of July, the ISG would be fully functional
and
able to
take activity forward with intelligence support from SIS. If
necessary, SIS should
be able to
sustain its own effort once the ISG was operational. In the
meantime,
Sir Richard
intended:
“… to put
more SIS staff (or staff borrowed from other Agencies) on the
ground and
to boost
the WMD-related effort in concert with the MOD. Our aim is
primarily to
identify
Iraqi scientists who will attest in public to what is in the
intelligence record.
As regard
logistics (ground penetrating radar, transport etc) I believe MOD
can offer
us all we
need.”
337.
Sir Richard
explained that, over the next six to eight weeks, SIS aimed to
pursue
to a
conclusion all CBW and missile leads involving more junior
scientists and officers.
In pursuing
those individuals, it would be important to agree a common position
on
adequate
incentive and immunities with the US. Mr Bowen was pursuing
the issue, but
it would
probably be necessary “to cut through the US bureaucracy to achieve
a rapid
satisfactory
outcome”.
162
Letter C to
Manning, 5 June 2003, ‘WMD in Iraq’.
488