1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
“Whatever
we do, we need to move to ‘smarter’ (but better enforced) sanctions
and
recapture
the moral high ground. We cannot achieve complete WMD
disarmament,
but we
should aim to contain Iraqi activity: UNMOVIC may be the best way
of doing
this, but
there are downsides to having UNMOVIC in Iraq and, anyway, Saddam
is
unlikely to
agree to their presence on Iraqi territory.”
186.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry that, in relation to regime
change:
“A lot of
these ideas were modelled on the successful policy that we had
been
pursuing in
relation to Serbia and President Milosevic. All these elements, a
contract
with the
Serbian people, information flows, indictments of the leader and
support for
the
opposition had brought down President Milosevic a few months
earlier, it was
successful
regime change policy.”102
187.
Mr Cook’s
Private Office wrote to No.10 on 20 February, advising that Mr
Cook
agreed with
much of the Cabinet Office note of 15 February but that he was
“concerned
that it
reflected military priorities at the expense of broader diplomatic
and political
issues”.103
In his
view, the Iraqi risk to Kuwait if patrolling ceased in the southern
NFZ
was
overstated: “Saddam should be in no doubt that should he move
against Kuwait,
the US/UK
response would be massive.” Mr Cook also questioned the suggestion
in
the note
that the alternative to the southern NFZ would be a need to station
up to three
additional
armoured brigades in Kuwait. He believed the UK should strongly
discourage
the US from
more active patrolling and advised that the UK should keep its
distance
from the US
policy of supporting Iraqi opposition groups in exile.
188.
Mr Cook
concluded: “Ultimately, however robust our military planning, our
policy
can succeed
only if there is a degree of international consensus.”
189.
Mr Cook also
asked to speak to Mr Blair to discuss the line he would take
at
Camp David.
190.
The Inquiry
has not seen a record of a conversation between Mr Blair and Mr
Cook
on Iraq at
this time.
191.
Mr Sawers
advised Mr Blair on 16 February that there was “one piece of
hard
policy to
discuss with President Bush and Colin Powell”:
Iraq.104
The US had
started a
policy
review and wanted to “get a new policy in place in the next month”.
No decisions
were yet
needed, but Mr Sawers suggested Mr Blair would want to familiarise
himself
with the
subject as President Bush would ask for his views.
102
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, page 11.
103
Letter
Sedwill to Sawers, 20 February 2001, ‘Iraq: Policy
Review’.
104
Minute
Sawers to Prime Minister, 16 February 2001, ‘Iraq: Policy
Review’.
227