3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
out that
Saddam Hussein was “wasting the UN opportunity with every day that
he failed
507.
Discussing the
difficulty of finding a smoking gun, Sir David told
Dr Rice:
“… we
should not give up on looking for hard evidence. The discovery of
the rocket
motors178
might not
be a breach of 1441, but it was important evidence that
Saddam
was
determined to thwart international controls. It told us much about
his approach
and
vindicated our claims that he was a liar.”
508.
Sir David
reported that he had:
“…
rehearsed again our need for a second resolution before moving to
military
action.
There would be support here for action against Iraq if sanctioned
by the UN.
But it
would be very hard, and probably impossible, for us without another
resolution.
The
domestic politics were too difficult.”
509.
Sir David
asked Dr Rice if the US would be content to let the
inspections run until
the end of
February; he “understood the military pressures” but it “would be
important
to UK and
wider European opinion to see the strongest possible case”. The UK
“would
want … time
to build this”. Sir David added that “the stronger the case,
the easier the
President
would find it to secure international support and a second
resolution”.
510.
Sir David
concluded that “at present it seems unlikely that there will be
enough
evidence”
by 27 January, “to persuade the Security Council to start work on
the
second resolution”.
511.
In public,
Mr Blair emphasised that the inspectors had only just started
work
and there
was no point in imposing an “arbitrary timescale”.
512.
Mr Blair’s
press conference on 13 January was dominated by questions on
Iraq.179
513.
In his opening
remarks, Mr Blair stated that, while the threat seemed to
some
people to
be remote, he passionately believed Iraq must be disarmed of its
weapons of
mass
destruction; the authority of the United Nations must be upheld;
and rogue states
and
terrorist organisations shown that “when we say we intend to deal
with the issue
of weapons
of mass destruction, we mean it”. The UN had “given Saddam
[Hussein]
a chance”;
he should take the peaceful route and disarm.
177
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 13 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
178
Illegally
imported Volga engines.
179
The
National Archives, 13 January 2003, PM Press
Conference.
91