The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

571. Asked how his “characterisation of his 7 March advice as a ‘green light’” sat with

his explanation that a “reasonable case does not mean that if the matter came before

a court” he “would be confident that the court would agree”, Lord Goldsmith wrote:

“I was relying on the precedent established in previous cases that a reasonable

or respectable case was sufficient. Precedent in the Law Officers’ department is

commonly followed. However I was careful to explain what I meant by the phrase

‘reasonable case’ and to highlight in my advice all the difficulties in interpreting the

effect of the resolution.”224

572. Lord Goldsmith added that, after delivering his advice of 7 March, he had:

“… continued to reflect on the position and on 13 March 2003 concluded that

the better view was there was a lawful basis for the use of force without a further

resolution.”

573. Asked how his “characterisation of his 7 March advice as a ‘green light’” sat

“with the number of difficulties with the argument that no further Security Council

determination” was needed which he had identified but not resolved in that advice,

Lord Goldsmith wrote:

“I was well aware of the contrary arguments and had set them out in detail in my

advice. They could not be resolved because the language of the resolution lacked

clarity and the statements made on adoption revealed differences of view within

the Council on the legal effect of the resolution. The issue for me therefore was to

consider whether the argument that the resolution authorised the use of force was

of sufficient weight to reach the threshold of certainty that my predecessors had

concluded was necessary. I concluded that it was and I knew that therefore I was

giving a ‘green light’.”225

574. Asked how his view – that a “reasonable case” was sufficient to decide on the

lawfulness of military action – reflected the framework of the UN Charter and the

prohibition on the use of force except in self-defence or where clearly authorised

by the Security Council in the circumstances set out in Chapter VII of the Charter,

Lord Goldsmith wrote:

“A ‘clear’ or ‘certain’ basis for the use of force will always be preferable to a

‘reasonable’ or ‘respectable’ one. That is why I argued in my advice of 7 March 2003

that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution

to authorise the use of force … If we had achieved the second resolution that would

have provided more certainty – although even then it is still likely to have been

in terms relying on the revival of the original 1990/91 authorisation which would

not have satisfied all international lawyers. We had however previously engaged

224 Statement, 4 January 2011, paragraph 6.3.

225 Statement, 4 January 2011, paragraph 6.4.

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