The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
19.
Although the
implementation of tactical plans to deal with lawlessness was
properly
the
responsibility of in-theatre commanders, it was the responsibility
of the Chief of the
Defence
Staff and the Chief of Joint Operations to ensure that appropriate
Rules of
Engagement
were set, and preparations made, to equip commanders on the
ground
to deal
with it effectively. They should have ensured that those steps were
taken.
20.
The impact of
looting was felt primarily by the Iraqi population rather than
by
Coalition
Forces. The latter initially experienced a “honeymoon
period”,5
although
the
situation
was far from stabilised.
21.
Lt Gen Reith
anticipated that UK forces could be reduced to a medium
scale
effort by
the autumn, when he expected the campaign to have reached “some
form
22.
The JIC
correctly judged on 16 April that the local population had high
hopes that
the
Coalition would rapidly improve their lives and that “resentment of
the Coalition …
could grow
quickly if it is seen to be ineffective, either politically or
militarily. Such
resentment
could lead to violence.”7
23.
By the end of
April, Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, had announced
that
UK troop
levels would fall to between 25,000 and 30,000 by the middle of
May, from
an initial
peak of around 46,000.
24.
Consequently,
by the start of May there was a clearly articulated expectation of
a
rapid
drawdown of UK forces by the autumn despite the identified risk
that the consent
of the
local population was built on potentially vulnerable foundations,
which could be
undermined
rapidly and with serious consequences.
25.
In the absence
of a functioning Iraqi police force and criminal justice system,
and
without a
clear Coalition Phase IV plan, looting and score-settling became a
serious
problem in
Baghdad soon after the regime fell. The looting of ministry
buildings
and damage
to state-owned infrastructure in particular added to the
challenges
of the Occupation.
26.
Reflecting in
June 2004, Mr David Richmond, the Prime Minister’s
Special
Representative
on Iraq from March to June 2004, judged that the failure to crack
down
on looting
in Baghdad in April 2003 released “a crime wave which the Coalition
has
never been
able to bring fully under control”.8
5
Public
hearing Walker, 1 February 2010, page 16.
6
Minute
Reith to SECCOS, 14 April 2003, ‘Phase 4: Roulement/Recovery of UK
Forces’ attaching Paper
CJO, 14
April 2003, ‘Phase 4 – Roulement/Recovery of UK Land
Forces’.
7
JIC
Assessment, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: The Initial Landscape
Post-Saddam’.
8
Telegram
359 IraqRep to FCO London, 28 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Valedictory: The
End of Occupation’.
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