The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
275.
The minute was
also sent to Mr Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer,
Mr Straw
and Sir Richard Wilson.
276.
Mr Hoon
wrote that he and Mr Straw had agreed a “preliminary
objective” to “guide
the
work”:
“A stable
and law‑abiding Iraq within its present borders, co‑operating with
the
international
community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or
international
security,
abiding by its international obligations on WMD.”
277.
The MOD had
looked at what it might be able to contribute “were the US
to
assemble a
coalition along the lines of that assembled for Operation Desert
Storm”,
the US‑led
operation (to liberate Kuwait) in 1990‑1991. The “key message” from
that
work
was:
“… if we
wish to be able to contribute meaningfully to any operation our
Armed
Forces
would need plenty of warning time, much more than we think the US
would
need
themselves. We are clear that, for the UK to have influence on
detailed
planning,
the US would require a significant contribution to any
large-scale
operation.
Our own analysis indicates that this would have to be at division
level for
land
forces. (It is possible that the objective could be achieved by a
more rapid blow,
but we
cannot count on that.)”
278.
Mr Hoon
also stated that “to plan properly” the UK needed to
know:
•
“what
outcome” the US was seeking;
•
“when the
US might wish to take action”; and
•
how long
the US saw itself remaining in Iraq.
279.
Mr Hoon
added that the UK needed “to clarify the policy basis and legal
justification
for any
action”.
280.
Mr Hoon
identified that the visit by Secretary Rumsfeld would provide
the
opportunity
to clarify US thinking but the UK faced a dilemma:
“On the one
hand, if we discuss the detail and timescales of a potential UK
military
contribution
to a US‑led coalition, it could send a misleading signal that we
have
decided to
support a specific line of military action. (Such a signal could be
used
in
Washington by the supporters of military action to promote their
cause.) Equally
if we are
not clear with the US at this stage about our military constraints,
we face
the danger
of our not being able to bring anything meaningful to the table at
the
right time
and the consequent loss of influence that would bring. Finally, it
could be
precisely
our readiness to participate that would allow you to counsel the
President
against
proceeding if no convincing plan were to emerge.”
216