12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
922.
Lt
Gen Dutton told the Inquiry that, on his arrival in June, “the
priority was definitely
Security
Sector Reform”.874
He said
that the UK was optimistic about progress in the
South‑East:
“I can
remember being told actually, in my briefings in the MOD, that my
job was to
go there
for six months and make sure nothing went wrong because things
were
going
right, you know, just keep the thing ticking over and we will be
okay.”
923.
He said that
the priority of SSR was skewed “massively” by the increased
security
threat
shortly after he arrived which meant that more resource had to be
devoted to
force
protection.
924.
At the Chiefs
of Staff meeting on 13 July, CJO briefed that, of the planned total
of
IPS
officers, 58 percent had now been recruited and
trained.875
Reports
suggested that
Maj Gen Dutton
was encouraged by the progress made.
925.
On 26 August
2005, the IPU produced a discussion paper on what
MND(SE)
should look
like in autumn 2006.876
The
objective for “security/Rule of Law” was:
“Security
forces (including police) which can provide sufficient law and
order to avert
descent
into full‑blown criminality and chaos, and which owe their
allegiance to the
state and
local administrations, with tribal and militia allegiances
managed.”
926.
The IPU noted
that local political parties were inserting their followers into
the
IPS and
that there were reports of assassinations, abductions, torture,
intimidation and
corruption.
927.
The IPU then
posed a number of suggestions and questions that needed to
be
addressed.
Alongside lobbying various politicians and securing convictions of
corrupt
police
officers, the IPU asked:
“•
How far do
we go in reaching out to Shia militiamen … Is it fruitless to
give
support to
a Chief of Police who has no militia links?
•
Working a
dialogue on ‘transfer of responsibility, not irresponsibility’,
into the
work of the
Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility in Baghdad
without
inadvertently
including a nebulous target and further conditions the Iraqis
cannot
hope to
meet.
•
A cultural
shift (on, eg, abuse, corruption) will take years. Are we prepared
to
commit
mentors and advisers for years to come?”
874
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, page 17.
875
Minutes, 13
July 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
876
Paper IPU,
26 August 2005, ‘MND (South‑East) in Autumn 2006: Discussion Paper’
attaching eGram
12326/05
[Basra] to Iraq Directorate, 1 September 2005, ‘Southern Iraq: the
Legacy’.
265