The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1378.
Because the
Ba’ath Party was closely intertwined with Iraq’s
bureaucracy,
the failure
of the US and UK to agree an approach to
de-Ba’athification
compounded
uncertainty about how the bureaucracy might perform
after
Saddam Hussein’s
departure.
1379.
In January
2002, the DIS stated that the Ba’ath Party, the Iraqi civil
bureaucracy
and the
armed forces were intertwined: “any ‘regime insider’ succeeding
Saddam
would find
the functional roles of the Party indispensable in administering
the state and
controlling
the populace”.600
1380.
The DIS paper
was included in Mr Blair’s summer reading pack at the end of
July.
1381.
The DFID
‘Northern Iraq Desktop Review’, circulated within DFID on 8
August,
stated that
many civil servants had resorted to alternative sources of income
or left the
country in
order to secure a stable income.601
1382.
The FCO paper
‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after Saddam’, sent to
No.10
on 26
September, stated that it was difficult to judge the extent to
which government
structures
would survive Saddam Hussein’s departure:
•
“The
national Ba’ath superstructure would almost certainly collapse if
Saddam
fell as a
result of military action, with the leadership seeking refuge. At
lower
levels,
Ba’ath structures might continue”.
•
Local power
lay with the Ba’ath Party leadership. The limited
supporting
bureaucracy
was unlikely to be able to take on a more extensive role “without
a
radical
overhaul”.
•
If Saddam
Hussein fell, particularly after US-led military action, “tribal,
regional
and
religious differences would probably come to the
fore”.602
1383.
The
“aftermath” section of the 30 September edition of the SPG paper on
UK
military
strategic thinking raised concerns about the US approach to
de-Ba’athification,
which could
run counter to the need for basic governance and increase
post-conflict
reliance on
the external authority.603
1384.
The FCO paper
‘International Administration for Iraq: what, who and how?’,
sent
to the AHGI
on 18 October, assessed that, if Saddam Hussein were overthrown
quickly
or “the
bulk of Ba’ath apparatchiks switched sides”, a “light” approach to
international
administration
might be possible, monitoring a local administration’s decisions
against
600
Paper DIS,
1 February 2002, ‘The Iraqi Ba’ath Party – its history, ideology
and role in regime security’.
601
Minute CHAD
Operations Team [junior official] to [DFID junior official], 8
August 2002, ‘Northern
Iraq
Desktop
Review and Background Briefing Document’ attaching Paper, Conflict
and Humanitarian Affairs
Department,
July 2002, ‘Northern Iraq Desktop Review and Background Briefing
Document’.
602
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 26 September 2002, ‘Scenarios for the future
of Iraq after Saddam’
attaching
Paper FCO, ‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after
Saddam’.
603
Paper
[SPG], 30 September 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
554