The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
192.
Mr Straw
told the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) on 4 March that it was “a
matter
of fact”
that Iraq had been in material breach “for some weeks” and
resolution 1441
provided
sufficient legal authority to justify military action against Iraq
if it was “in further
193.
Mr Straw
also stated that a majority of members of the Security Council had
been
opposed to
the suggestion that resolution 1441 should state explicitly that
military action
could be
taken only if there were a second resolution.
194.
Mr Blair
was informed on the evening of 4 March that US military planners
were
looking at
12 March as the possible start date for the military campaign; and
that
Mr Geoff
Hoon, the Defence Secretary, was concerned about the apparent
disconnect
with
activity in the UN.84
195.
Baroness Amos,
Minister of State, Department for International
Development
(DFID),
advised on 4 March that Angola, Cameroon and Guinea were not yet
ready
to commit
to a “yes vote” and had emphasised the need for P5
unity.85
196.
Sir Christopher
Hum, British Ambassador to China, advised on 4 March
that,
if the resolution
was put to a vote that day, China would abstain.86
197.
Sir John
Holmes, British Ambassador to France, advised on 4 March
that
France’s main
aim was to “avoid being put on the spot” by influencing the
undecided,
preventing
the US and UK mustering nine votes, and keeping alongside the
Russians
and
Chinese; and that there was “nothing that we can now do to dissuade
them from
this course”.87
Sir John
also advised that “nothing the French say at this stage,
even
privately,
should be taken at face value”.
198.
Mr Igor
Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, told Mr Straw on 4 March
that Russia
had failed
in an attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to leave and it would veto
a
resolution
based on the draft circulated on 24 February.88
199.
France,
Germany and Russia stated on 5 March that they would not let a
resolution
pass that
authorised the use of force.89
Russia and
France, “as Permanent Members of
the
Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this
point”.
83
Minutes,
Foreign Affairs Committee (House of Commons), 4 March 2003,
[Evidence Session],
Qs 151 and
154.
84
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Timing of Military
Action’.
85
Minute Amos
to Foreign Secretary, 4 March 2003, [untitled].
86
Telegram 90
Beijing to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Lobbying the
Chinese’.
87
Telegram
110 Paris to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Avoiding a French
Veto’.
88
Telegram 37
FCO London to Moscow, 3 [sic] March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Meetings with
Russian
Foreign Minister, 4 March’.
89
The
Guardian, 5 March
2003, UN war
doubters unite against resolution;
The
Guardian, 6 March
2003,
Full text of
Joint declaration.
28