The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

443. Mr Straw characterised France’s position as “extraordinary”.

444. In remarks to the press in Downing Street, Mr Straw said that he found it

“extraordinary” that France had rejected the UK’s proposals “without even proper

consideration”.137 That made a peaceful resolution of the crisis “more difficult”.

445. On 13 March, Sir David Manning asked Mr Rycroft for the full text of President

Chirac’s remarks of 10 March, which was circulated within No.10.138

446. President Chirac’s Diplomatic Adviser, Mr Maurice Gourdault-Montagne,

complained about the UK Government’s “increasingly polemical approach”, its

interpretation of President Chirac’s remarks out of context, and the difficulties

with the UK tests.

447. Sir John Holmes robustly defended the UK position.

448. Mr Gourdault-Montagne telephoned Sir John Holmes at lunch time on 13 March

“to complain about the increasingly polemical approach” the UK was taking.139

449. Mr Gourdault-Montagne stated that the UK approach “ran counter to the

understanding hitherto that we should try to minimise the bilateral fall-out and avoid

mutual or personalised criticism”. France was “particularly upset by our repeated taking

out of context … the President’s remarks on the veto in all circumstances”. The UK

“must be well aware that he had been talking about the particular circumstances that

evening … It was not reasonable to distort what he had said in this way.” Mr Straw’s

reaction to Mr de Villepin’s statement “had also seemed excessively sharp”.

450. Sir John Holmes reported that he had responded that France:

“… could hardly be surprised if it became harder to avoid criticism of the French

position when they had spelled out their intention to veto the draft of their allies,

apparently whatever it said. The French were doing everything they could to block

us, not least in our attempt to give a last chance to Saddam to disarm peacefully and

to achieve the second resolution which would reunite the international community

and make international participation in the next stage easier. Villepin’s statement …

this morning attacking our proposals had been particularly hard to take.”

451. Sir John stated that the UK “conditions” were taken from the UNMOVIC report

and “were precisely the questions which needed answering if we were to conclude that

Saddam Hussein had taken a strategic decision to disarm”.

452. Mr Gourdault-Montagne responded by saying that the requirement that Saddam

Hussein should appear on TV to apologise was “a nonsense”. The UK “knew the Arab

137 The Independent, 13 March 2003, Britain furious at ‘extraordinary’ French statement.

138 Manuscript comments Manning to Rycroft, 13 March 2003, on Email Rycroft to No.10 officials,

12 March 2003, ‘French veto – urgent’.

139 Telegram 127 Paris to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘France: Iraq’.

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