9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
abroad.
Bowen described al-Rhadi as Iraq’s most prominent corruption
enforcer,
but by
September 2007 al-Rhadi had resigned following repeated death
threats,
and
subsequently sought asylum in the US. Bowen called the corruption
problem
‘the second
insurgency’ for its destabilising effects on Iraq. We judge that
the
US
draw‑down will have an impact on oversight, making international
scrutiny
of institutional
corruption more difficult.”
450.
The CIG
assessed that corruption was “driven both by a desire for
personal
enrichment
and by political considerations” and that “the practice of
soliciting bribes at
checkpoints
was commonplace”. Shia militias had “exploited their control of
economic
assets for
political gain”.
451.
The CIG judged
that “the Iraqi public is more tolerant of certain kinds of
corruption
such as
nepotism than in the West, but is growing tired of political
graft”. That had “led to
an increase
in anti-corruption rhetoric, but little change in behaviour”. The
Assessment
stated:
“In May
[2009] CI announced that 97 officials were under investigation for
graft,
including
53 ranked as Directors-General or higher, and that 120 Iraqis had
been
arrested
for corruption in April and May. On 30 May former Trade Minister
Sudani
was
arrested on charges of embezzlement and corruption regarding food
imports
and rations
under the Public Distribution System, which was established in
1995
as part
of the UN Oil-for-Food Programme following the 1991 Gulf
War.”
452.
The CIG
reported that, in mid-June, the son of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani
had
urged Prime
Minister Maliki to lead the fight against political corruption,
believing that
corruption
and the provision of public services would be the public’s
fundamental
preoccupations
in the forthcoming elections.
453.
The CIG judged
that nepotism and cronyism were “widespread” in
Kurdistan,
where:
“Lucrative
construction contracts are regularly awarded to families of party
or
regional
government officials. Corruption has become a prominent issue in
the run
up to the
KRG parliamentary elections …”
454.
The CIG
assessed that corruption also affected governance at regional and
local
levels.
Endemic public sector corruption in Basra had prevented the
delivery of social
security
payments, and health and education services.
455.
The CIG also
assessed that:
“The lack
of effective anti money-laundering and counter-terrorism finance
regimes
deters
foreign financial institutions from doing business with their Iraqi
counterparts,
and
severely cramps the development of the Iraqi financial
sector.”
459