9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
247.
On 30 October,
the BBC reported that senior military commanders were
“infuriated”
by the
withdrawal of civilian staff, claiming that it gave weight to the
argument that the
insurgents
were winning.144
248.
Around the end
of October, Sir David Manning suggested that a small team
should
“start –
very privately – considering the implications of a withdrawal from
Iraq”, including
the
consequences for Iraq, the Iranian reaction and the power balance
in the region.145
249.
In a video
conference with President Bush on 2 November Mr Blair said
that the
key issues
on Iraq were:
•
whether
Prime Minister Maliki had effective strategies for Sunni and
Kurdish
outreach;
•
identifying
and filling gaps in the Iraqi Army’s capability;
•
identifying
shortfalls in “governance capability”, for example effective
public
spending;
and
•
ensuring
that discussion of renewing the Security Council resolution
was
“handled
sufficiently carefully”.146
250.
Mr Blair
also raised concerns about whether Prime Minister Maliki was
supported
by a
structure that allowed him to make and implement decisions, in
particular in
controlling
the army.
251.
The weekly
update was sent by Maj Gen Shirreff’s Chief of Staff on 2
November,
who noted
that the withdrawal of FCO staff was one of the events that had
dominated
the
preceding week.147
He reported
that the withdrawal had come as a surprise to
MND(SE) and
was expected to have an adverse impact because:
•
The
reduction in police advisers would mean that it would be possible
to staff the
Police
Transition Teams but not to train the specialist police teams that
would
take over
from the Specialist Crime Unit.
•
The loss of
prison advisers came just before a planned move of prisoners
out
of the
Jameat facility into a new facility.
•
There would
be disruption to long‑term reconstruction work as a result of
the
“haste with
which the PRT has been evacuated”.
252.
Mr Blair
and Mr Hadley met for two hours on 4 November.148
144
BBC
News, 30
October 2006, Basra
consulate staff relocated.
145
Letter
Gould to Crompton, 1 November 2006, ‘Iran and Iraq’.
146
Letter
Banner to Hayes, 2 November 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 2 November:
Middle East
issues’.
147
Minute
Everard, 2 November 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 2
November 2006’.
148
Letter
Sheinwald to Hayes, 6 November 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with
US National Security
Adviser, 4
November’.
49