Previous page | Contents | Next page
9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007
247.  On 30 October, the BBC reported that senior military commanders were “infuriated”
by the withdrawal of civilian staff, claiming that it gave weight to the argument that the
insurgents were winning.144
248.  Around the end of October, Sir David Manning suggested that a small team should
“start – very privately – considering the implications of a withdrawal from Iraq”, including
the consequences for Iraq, the Iranian reaction and the power balance in the region.145
November 2006
249.  In a video conference with President Bush on 2 November Mr Blair said that the
key issues on Iraq were:
whether Prime Minister Maliki had effective strategies for Sunni and Kurdish
outreach;
identifying and filling gaps in the Iraqi Army’s capability;
identifying shortfalls in “governance capability”, for example effective public
spending; and
ensuring that discussion of renewing the Security Council resolution was
“handled sufficiently carefully”.146
250.  Mr Blair also raised concerns about whether Prime Minister Maliki was supported
by a structure that allowed him to make and implement decisions, in particular in
controlling the army.
251.  The weekly update was sent by Maj Gen Shirreff’s Chief of Staff on 2 November,
who noted that the withdrawal of FCO staff was one of the events that had dominated
the preceding week.147 He reported that the withdrawal had come as a surprise to
MND(SE) and was expected to have an adverse impact because:
The reduction in police advisers would mean that it would be possible to staff the
Police Transition Teams but not to train the specialist police teams that would
take over from the Specialist Crime Unit.
The loss of prison advisers came just before a planned move of prisoners out
of the Jameat facility into a new facility.
There would be disruption to long‑term reconstruction work as a result of the
“haste with which the PRT has been evacuated”.
252.  Mr Blair and Mr Hadley met for two hours on 4 November.148
144  BBC News, 30 October 2006, Basra consulate staff relocated.
145  Letter Gould to Crompton, 1 November 2006, ‘Iran and Iraq’.
146  Letter Banner to Hayes, 2 November 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 2 November:
Middle East issues’.
147  Minute Everard, 2 November 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 2 November 2006’.
148  Letter Sheinwald to Hayes, 6 November 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with US National Security
Adviser, 4 November’.
49
Previous page | Contents | Next page