The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“Could I have ignored or dismissed such reports at the time? Absolutely not.”

676.  Mr Tenet concluded that, based on the data collected over the previous 10 years,

it would have been difficult for analysts to reach conclusions other than those in the NIE.

But the intelligence community needed to reflect on a number of questions, including:

• Did the history of Saddam Hussein’s behaviour cause the intelligence

community to overlook alternative scenarios?

• Did the failure to spot how close Saddam Hussein came to acquiring a nuclear

weapon in the early 1990s lead to over-estimation of his programmes in 2002?

• Was the absence of information flowing from a repressive regime considered

carefully?

• Were policy-makers told clearly what was and was not known?

The search for WMD, January to July 2004

677.  On 9 February, Mr Duelfer informed Mr Blair that:

• the ISG would now focus its effort on people rather than sites;

• he was not yet prepared to conclude that there were no WMD in Iraq; and

• he envisaged an interim report in March.

678.  Mr Blair remained concerned about the nature of the public debate on WMD.

679.  Mr Duelfer called on Mr Blair in London on 9 February.376 In answer to questions

from Mr Blair, he said that:

• The ISG had much work to do and had the resources it needed to get to the

bottom of the issue.

• The ISG would now focus on people rather than sites. There were also “vast

mounds” of documents to examine.

• The ISG “must examine the strategic intentions of Saddam’s regime.

His [Mr Duelfer’s] hypothesis was that the regime’s strategy was to outlast the

UN and sanctions. We could not make judgements until this was proven.”

• He was not yet prepared to conclude that the weapons were not there.

• He envisaged an interim report in March, but the final report was “some

time away”.

680.  Mr Rycroft’s record of the meeting stated that Mr Blair was:

“… content with the timing of late March for the next ISG interim report … provided

that it does not slip. Its handling will require military precision, since its content will

fix the debate on WMD for the months ahead.”

376  Letter Rycroft to Baker, 9 February 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group: Meeting with Duelfer’.

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