The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1117.
Mr de
Villepin proposed that the pace of inspections should be stepped up
on the
basis
of:
•
a hierarchy
of key disarmament tasks drawn from UNMOVIC’s work
programme;
•
a progress
report from the inspectors every three weeks to maintain
the
pressure on
the Iraqi authorities; and
•
a schedule
for assessing implementation: France was willing to shorten
the
time-frame
of 120 days set out in resolution 1284 if the inspectors thought
that
was feasible.
1118.
Mr de
Villepin stated that the “military agenda must not dictate the
calendar
of
inspections”. France could not “accept an ultimatum as long as the
inspectors are
reporting
progress”. He asked whether “by imposing a deadline of a few days”,
that
would be
“merely seeking a pretext for war”. Some countries might believe
that problems
could be
solved by force, but not France. It believed that the use of force
could “give rise
to
resentment and to hatred, and fuel a clash of identities and
civilisations – something
that our
generation has a prime responsibility to avert”.
1119.
Mr de
Villepin stated:
“To those
who believe that war would be the quickest way to disarm Iraq, I
can reply
that it
would create divisions and cause wounds that would be long in the
healing …
“… force is
certainly not the best way of bringing about democracy. In this
case and
in others,
it would encourage a dangerous instability.
“… War
would only increase it [terrorism], and we could then be faced with
a new
wave of
violence. Let us beware of playing into the hands of those who want
a clash
of
civilisations or a clash of religions.”
1120.
Mr de
Villepin stated that France understood the “profound sense of
insecurity
with which
the American people had been living since the tragedy of 11
September
2001”, but
there was nothing to indicate a link between the Iraq regime and Al
Qaida and
the world
would not be a safer place after a military intervention in
Iraq.
1121.
Mr de
Villepin argued for priority to be given to addressing the crisis
in the Middle
East, which
represented “our greatest challenge in terms of security and
justice”.
1122.
Mr de
Villepin concluded that the Council would face a choice of
disarming Iraq
through war
or peace, and that to make that choice heads of State and
Government
should
meet.
1123.
Mr Tang
stated that resolution 1441 had been “widely welcomed and
supported”
because it
manifested the determination of the Council to destroy Iraq’s WMD
and “truly
reflected
the desire of the international community for a political
settlement”. There
had been
“much progress” on inspections. It was “true” that there were
“problems and
difficulties”,
but that was “exactly why” it was “necessary to continue the
inspections”.
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