10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
was
exploring the possibility of seconding a senior private sector
expert to that team,
who would
be funded by the UK and act as the UK’s representative on the
team.
318.
Ms Hewitt’s
briefing for the meeting stated that the US had decided that the
OAB,
which was
to “advise the Oil Ministry”, would not be constituted due to the
level of
technical
skill within the Ministry and Iraqi suspicions over the OAB’s
role.171
The
CPA
oil sector
team would be “more operational”. It currently consisted of four
Americans and
one
Australian; the US were “sounding out” one UK oil
expert.
319.
The CPA’s
‘Vision for Iraq’, which had been drafted by the CPA’s Office of
Strategic
Planning,
was agreed by senior Pentagon officials on 18 July.172
The
underpinning
implementation
plan, ‘Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to the
Iraqi
People’,
was circulated to members of Congress on 23 July.173
320.
Neither
document considered the development of the oil sector in any
detail.
‘Achieving
the Vision’ defined a large number of objectives,
including:
•
establish
and train a Facilities Protection Service;
•
remove
subsidies, including on oil; and
•
design an
oil trust fund, to be operational by February 2004.174
Work by the
CPA
to develop
the Iraq Heritage Trust is described later in this
Section.
321.
There was no
objective for increasing oil production.
322.
On 24 July,
representatives from the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, the CPA, and
USACE
approved
the Iraq Oil Infrastructure Restoration Plan, which aimed to
restore oil
infrastructure
to its pre-war production capacity.175
The authors
of the Plan described
it as the
result of a joint, collective effort by the Ministry of Oil, USACE,
KBR staff, the
Iraq
Reconstruction and Development Council, and the CPA. The key event
within
the
planning process was a workshop from 6 to 9 July, which was
attended by over
100 participants.
323.
The attendance
list for the workshop did not include any UK
representatives.
324.
The Inquiry
has seen no indications that the UK Government was aware of
that
planning
process.
325.
USACE issued
the Plan to contractors on 1 August.
171
Minute DTI
[junior official] to PS/Mrs Hewitt, 2 July 2003, ‘Next Meeting of
the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group
on Iraq
Rehabilitation: Thursday 3 July 2003’.
172
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
173
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. Threshold,
2006.
174
Paper
Coalition Provisional Authority, 21 July 2003, ‘Achieving the
Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to
the Iraqi
People’.
175
Tappan
SE. Shock and
Awe in Fort Worth. Pourquoi
Press, 2004.
421