3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
that the
Iraqi threat is over. Dealing with it … will help us stabilise the
Middle
East (it’s
what moderate Arabs privately want). And, with this behind us, we
can
get
together to bring the full range of diplomatic pressures to bear on
those who
proliferate
or support terrorism.”
•
A
multilateral approach to the problem was “hanging in the balance”.
Mr Blair
had
“persuaded” President Bush to go through the UN because he wanted
to
“preserve
the Security Council” and wanted “the UN – and all of us,
Russia
included –
to have a say in what happens thereafter in and around
Iraq”.
That was
“as much in Russia’s interest as the UK’s”.
1172.
The
conversation with President Putin lasted over an hour.
Mr Blair emphasised
the
importance of working with Russia as a partner and the need to
stand firm in
dealing
with the threat of terrorism and WMD.352
The record
stated that Mr Blair had told
President
Putin that resolution 1441 had given Saddam Hussein a final
opportunity:
“He had
made some concessions with troops on his doorstep, but he was
not
co‑operating
fully and had no intention of disarming. We must carry out what
we
had said
we would do to uphold UN authority and avoid unilateral action. So
we
would put
the second resolution to a vote, with terms to be discussed. We
would
have nine
or ten votes.”
1173.
During the
conversation – and in response to a suggestion that Iraq was
currently
co-operating,
presented no threat to its close neighbours or to the US or UK,
had
nothing to
do with fundamentalist terrorists, and that inspections should
continue on the
basis of
the disarmament tasks based on resolution 1284 (1999) –
Mr Blair argued that
the time
required was that needed to make a judgement about whether there
was full
Iraqi
co-operation; and that Dr Blix’s “clusters” document would set
out the outstanding
items. In
his view:
“In the
absence of full co-operation, Iraq was in breach … we must explore
every
possibility
to resolve the issue peacefully, including through forcing Saddam
into
exile.
Saddam would only do so if he thought the alternative was
force.”
1174.
Mr Rycroft
recorded that President Putin thought military action would be
a
mistake
which Russia would oppose. He commented that President Putin had
been:
“…
unyielding, but at pains to spell out his reasoning in great detail
… On the face
of it,
a clear intention to veto. But there may have been just a hint that
if negotiations
begin in
New York, and engage Moscow, that he will at least be ready to
listen.”
352
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President Putin,
7 March’.
393