The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
There was “no
intelligence” that Iraq had “provided CB materials to Al
Qaida”.
•
The JIC
continued “to judge that in the event
of imminent regime collapse
there would
be a risk of transfer of such material, whether or not
as
deliberate
Iraqi regime policy”.
•
The JIC also
judged that Al Qaida retained “its long-standing interest in
acquiring
a nuclear
device”, but had “no convincing intelligence that it has done
so”.
Al Qaida in
Iraq
•
There was “no
intelligence” to suggest that Al Qaida planned to carry out
attacks
under Iraqi
direction.
•
Intelligence
showed “the presence of Al Qaida associated extremists
in
Baghdad.
[…] We do not know what the current presence is, its purpose, or
what
relationship
it has to Saddam’s regime, if any.”
•
The JIC judged
that it was “unlikely that the Iraqi regime” were “unaware” of
the
Al Qaida
presence but it did not know whether those terrorists planned to
conduct
activities
in or from Iraq.
•
Intelligence
suggested “the presence of […] Al Qaida-linked terrorists in
North
Eastern
Iraq, in the KAZ, with safe haven provided by Ansar al-Islam, an Al
Qaida-
associated
extremist group”.
•
“Some of these
individuals” were “involved in production and
distribution
of CB materials”.
•
Intelligence
showed that extremists continued to arrive in the
region.
•
The terrorists
might “re-locate in the event of imminent Coalition action”
but
“equally
they could
conduct terrorist activities (including possible use of
CB
materials) or
guerrilla actions against Coalition forces in Iraq”.
Iraqi
terrorism
•
The JIC had
previously judged that Saddam Hussein “would aspire to
conduct
terrorist
attacks against Coalition interests in the event of military action
against
him, or
possibly if he believed an attack was inevitable”.
•
Authoritative
reporting suggested that “Iraqi
Intelligence (DGI) has little reach
or capability
outside Iraq”.
•
The JIC had
“no intelligence of Iraqi intentions to conduct CB terrorist
attacks
using DGI
or its agents; but such activity remains a
possibility”.
•
Iraqi plans
for terrorist activity in the event of conflict would
be:
“…
dependent on individual operatives’ willingness to implement them,
which
will be in
doubt if they perceive regime change to be certain.
But the
threat
from terrorism
conducted or directed by DGI cannot be discounted.”
181.
Addressing the
prospects for the future, the JIC Assessment
concluded:
“Despite a
significant body of intelligence on Iraq’s preparations to
conduct
terrorism
against Western interests, […], we have seen no persuasive
evidence
that these
efforts will be effective. Al Qaida
and associated groups will continue
to
represent by far the greatest terrorist threat to Western
interests, and that
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