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2  |  Decision-making within government
the Chairman was “specifically charged with ensuring that the Committee’s
monitoring and warning role is discharged effectively”; and
“report to the Secretary of the Cabinet”, except where “special assessments”
were required by the Chiefs of Staff, which would be “submitted to them directly
in the first instance”.
184.  The JIC agrees most Assessments before they are sent to Ministers and senior
officials, although some papers, including urgent updates on developing issues, are
issued under the authority of the Chief of the Assessments Staff.
185.  The current JIC terms of reference make clear that it is expected to draw on “secret
intelligence, diplomatic reporting and open source material.”109
186.  JIC Assessments are most frequently produced in response to a request from a
policy department which determines the precise issues to be addressed. The JIC also
commissions Assessments and can direct that the ground covered in any Assessment
should be amended if it considers that is required.
187.  Some CIG Assessments are issued under the authority of the Chief of the
Assessments Staff and are noted but not discussed by the JIC, including where the
content is regarded as routine or as an update of previous Assessments.
188.  Iraq was regularly considered by the JIC in 2000 and 2001, with the focus
on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sanctions and the implications of the
No‑Fly Zones.110
189.  Sir John Scarlett considered that Iraq had been one of the top priorities for the
JIC for most of his time as Chairman.111
190.  As Chairman of the JIC, Mr Scarlett attended many of the meetings on Iraq held by
Mr Blair and provided advice and briefing, including in response to requests from No.10.
191.  In late July 2002, Mr Scarlett was asked to provide updated intelligence on Iraq on
a weekly basis for Mr Blair’s weekend box.112
192.  Mr Scarlett provided the first ‘Weekly Intelligence Summary’ on Iraq on 26 July.113
193.  From 15 November, the Summary was replaced by an ‘Intelligence Update’
produced by the Assessments Staff. Until the end of January 2003, the Updates were
produced weekly. In February the frequency increased, rising to three a week by the end
of the month.
109  Cabinet Office, National Intelligence Machinery, November 2010, page 26.
110  Public hearing Webb, Ricketts and Patey, 24 November 2009, pages 51-54.
111 Public hearing, 8 December 2009, page 10.
112  Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq Prime Minister’s Meeting, 23 July: Follow Up’.
113  Minute Scarlett to Manning, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Weekly Intelligence Summary’
297
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