The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
59.
On 25 April,
Mr Dowse asked Mr Peter Ricketts, Chairman of the JIC
from
September
2000 to September 2001, for his help.28
Mr Dowse
wrote that there was
“growing
frustration” in the FCO that:
“… while we
continue publicly to emphasise our concerns about the rebuilding
of
Iraqi WMD
(and indeed the current UK/US review of policy looks like putting
even
more
emphasis on this angle), the lines we have to deploy are based
entirely on
pre‑Desert
Fox material and are showing signs of too much recycling.
Requests
earlier
this year from the Foreign Secretary and the FCO Policy Advisory
Board for
more
up-to-date material received no response.”
60.
A Defence
Intelligence Staff (DIS) review of the intelligence had
produced
“somewhat
disappointing results”.
61.
Mr Dowse
added that he understood the difficulties, but wrote:
“… it may
be that there really is no more we can say and that we will have
to
rely on
clever re-packaging. But our material compares unfavourably with
fuller
and fresher
briefings […] … I wonder whether it might be worth a meeting to
go
over the
possibilities, on the lines of the exercise the Cabinet Office
co-ordinated
just before Desert
Fox, which produced an ‘unclassified JIC paper’ and a
note
for MPs,
journalists etc?”
62.
The UK
Government has been unable to identify any response to this
minute.29
63.
An
Assessment issued on 10 May 2001, examining the UK’s ability to
identify
Iraq’s WMD
facilities and the impact of military action, marked a shift in the
JIC’s
perception
of Iraq’s intentions and activities.
64.
The JIC
acknowledged that the evidence base for its judgements
on
developments
since December 1998 was “patchy”, but stated that Iraq
was
“becoming
bolder” in conducting prohibited activities.
65.
At the request
of the MOD, a further JIC Assessment examining “what we
know
of Iraq’s
WMD programmes, their future direction, our level of confidence in
the
intelligence,
our confidence in being able to identify the location of Iraq’s WMD
facilities
accurately
and the potential impact of direct military action against them”,
was produced
28
Letter
Dowse to Ricketts, 25 April 2001, ‘Iraqi WMD: Public messages’
attaching Minute DI ACR to
Wedge, 29
March 2001, ‘Iraq: Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass
Destruction’ and Minute
DI ACR
to Wedge, 11 April 2001, ‘Iraq: Release of Information Concerning
Iraqi Regeneration of Bombed
Facilities
to the Press’.
29
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 22 July 2015,
‘Declassification 3.3-MA’.
30
JIC
Assessment, 10 May 2001, ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes: Status and
Vulnerability’.
24