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10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
the worst offenders”) and the existing Iraqi legal code, stripped of the more repressive
elements introduced by Saddam Hussein’s regime.129 The Red Team judged that:
“If the IIA can provide a secure environment (including the rule of law), resolve
short‑term economic problems and address immediate humanitarian needs,
future Iraqi-led government structures and a process of justice and reconciliation
will emerge naturally, given time.”
Decisions to increase UK support for ORHA
216.  On 9 April, in his budget statement to the House of Commons, Mr Gordon Brown,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced that he had set aside “an additional
US$100m” to “back up the UN and the work of reconstruction and development”
(see Section 13.1).130
217.  On 15 April, Mr Boateng advised Ms Short how those funds could be drawn
down.131 He understood that DFID did not need access to additional funds immediately,
given that humanitarian and reconstruction work was at a very early stage, and that
DFID had £95m of uncommitted resources, but he fully expected DFID to bid for
additional funding for Iraq “in the next few months”. Before DFID drew on the new
allocation, Ms Short should write to him, setting out her proposals for how the additional
money would be spent.
218.  Mr Straw chaired the first meeting of the AHMGIR on 10 April.132 Mr Straw told
the meeting:
“The prospects for further UN Security Council resolutions were uncertain and
negotiations were very likely to take weeks.”
219.  Lord Goldsmith said that he was content for ORHA to undertake humanitarian,
security and public order duties and to restore civilian administration but “it must be
careful not to impose reform and restructuring without further legal authority”. US and
UK lawyers would try to agree a Memorandum of Understanding to define how the UK
would be consulted.
220.  Summing up the discussion, Mr Straw described the meeting’s agreement that
“the UK should retain a right of veto in extremis” on ORHA activities. UK support should
increase and be formalised through:
confirmation of Maj Gen Cross’s position as one of Lt Gen Garner’s deputies;
an increase in the number of UK secondees;
129  Minute PS/CDI to APS2/SoS [MOD], 18 April 2003, ‘Iraq Red Team – The Strands of the Rope’
attaching Paper DIS Red Team, [undated], ‘Iraq Red Team: The Strands of the Rope’.
130  House of Commons, Official Report, 9 April 2003, column 271.
131  Letter Boateng to Short, 15 April 2003, ‘Budget announcement on Iraq’.
132  Minutes, 10 April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
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